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ABSTRACT

As reconfigurable devices‟ capacities and the complexity of applications that use them increase,
the need for self-reliance of deployed systems becomes increasingly prominent. A Sustainable
Modular Adaptive Redundancy Technique (SMART) composed of a dual-layered organic system
is proposed, analyzed, implemented, and experimentally evaluated. SMART relies upon a variety
of self-regulating properties to control availability, energy consumption, and area used, in
dynamically-changing environments that require high degree of adaptation. The hardware layer
is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-4 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to provide selfrepair using a novel approach called a Reconfigurable Adaptive Redundancy System (RARS). The
software layer supervises the organic activities within the FPGA and extends the self-healing
capabilities through application-independent, intrinsic, evolutionary repair techniques to leverage
the benefits of dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (PR).

A SMART prototype is evaluated using a Sobel edge detection application. This prototype is
shown to provide sustainability for stressful occurrences of transient and permanent fault
injection procedures while still reducing energy consumption and area requirements. An Organic
Genetic Algorithm (OGA) technique is shown capable of consistently repairing hard faults while
maintaining correct edge detector outputs, by exploiting spatial redundancy in the reconfigurable
hardware.

A Monte Carlo driven Continuous Markov Time Chains (CTMC) simulation is conducted to
compare SMART‟s availability to industry-standard Triple Modular Technique (TMR)
iii

techniques. Based on nine use cases, parameterized with realistic fault and repair rates acquired
from publically available sources, the results indicate that availability is significantly enhanced
by the adoption of fast repair techniques targeting aging-related hard-faults. Under harsh
environments, SMART is shown to improve system availability from 36.02% with lengthy repair
techniques to 98.84% with fast ones. This value increases to “five nines” (99.9998%) under
relatively more favorable conditions.

Lastly, SMART is compared to twenty eight standard TMR benchmarks that are generated by
the widely-accepted BL-TMR tools. Results show that in seven out of nine use cases, SMART is
the recommended technique, with power savings ranging from 22% to 29%, and area savings
ranging from 17% to 24%, while still maintaining the same level of availability.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the significance of the problem will be defined and a solution framework will be
presented. Moreover, the contributions of the dissertation will be highlighted, emphasizing the
innovation and novelty in SMART as a fault-tolerance technique targeting reconfigurable
devices in mission-critical applications.

1.1. Need for Autonomous Repair in Mission Critical Applications
Current high-performance processing systems frequently consist of heterogeneous processor
cores or subsystems that depend on one another in nontrivial ways. Each subsystem is itself a
multi-component system with diverse capabilities. The organization of these subsystems is
typically static; it is determined with great care at design time and optimized for a particular
mode of operation. This design strategy is appropriate for systems that are accessible for repair
when their components fail. However, systems which are unreachable once deployed present a
different set of challenges. In these systems, the failure of a single component may result in
large-scale inefficiency or even complete mission failure.

Therefore, electronic systems operating in demanding environments require increased capability
for autonomous fault tolerance and self-adaptation, especially as system complexities and
interdependencies increase. Hence, the goal of Organic Computing (OC) techniques [1, 2] is to
create systems capable of adaptive and fault-tolerant behaviors. The OC paradigm is compatible
with biologically-inspired computing concepts that emphasize the so-called "self-x properties"
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which emerge at the system-level and represent life-like properties such as self-configuration,
self-reorganization, and self-healing [2, 3]. These properties must be maintained in an
autonomous fashion yet be sufficiently constrained to avoid the emergence of undesirable
behaviors.

Complex digital systems that are able to operate autonomously for long periods of time without
external repair are essential for reducing the risk involved in mission-critical applications, such
as space, deep-sea, manned and unmanned avionic missions, and deployments to remote or
perilous terrestrial areas. For instance, a military or commercial satellite that cannot recover from
a hardware failure becomes orbiting space junk or must be replaced, thereby incurring great
economic costs and negative societal impact. In contrast, a sustainable self-aware satellite would
offer increased dependability and extended lifetime. Organic computing is one of the most
promising approaches to realizing such dependable systems.

1.2. Advantages of Reconfigurable Logic to Support Fault-Tolerance
The OC paradigm is seldom tied to a particular platform or implementation, which makes it
relatively broad in its impact and unrestricted with respect to any specific research or industrial
context. Nonetheless, the immense flexibility of reconfigurable hardware devices makes them
especially suited to hosting OC applications [4]. The fact that SRAM-based FPGAs can be
dynamically reconfigured has made them a popular hardware platform for numerous OC systems
[4, 5].

2

Several external environmental or internally-driven performance demands may require a change
in the configuration of a multi-component system to maintain functionality and throughput
throughout an extended mission [6]. For instance, a fault may occur in an individual component,
which must then be replaced, refurbished to some degree, or otherwise bypassed. Although one
could hypothesize that routine hardware failures would be a likely trigger for configuration
change, other mission-level considerations, such as a storage device reaching its capacity or the
environment deviating from expectation, could be handled similarly. In either case, existing
modules must be reconfigured; SRAM-based FPGA devices facilitate this flexibility by enabling
dynamic device reconfiguration.

SRAM FPGAs represent

ideal platforms for hosting organic computing hardware

implementations due to their ability to reconfigure a system at any time to adapt to events that
necessitate a change in the hardware, such as fault-occurrence or changes in mission
requirements. The following reasons justify our selection of reconfigurable devices to host
SMART:

1. Reconfigurable hardware allows fast, in situ reconfiguration of a hardware device. This
characteristic has been utilized in SMART to circumvent faulty resources in the hardware
by maintaining collections of Amorphous Spares (AS), which are pre-seeded bitstream
files that represent the same functionality of the circuit, though with different
implementations or area constraints. Once errors are detected, these AS can be
downloaded and tested individually to determine if any of them do not make use of the
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faulty resource on the fabric. This approach is not possible on Application Specific
Integrated Circuits (ASIC) due to the fixed nature of their hardware fabric.

2. Dynamic PR allows for the reconfiguration of faulty components while the system is kept
online. This method can be coupled with hardware redundancy such that the repair
process can operate on the faulty part of the system, while other redundant parts continue
in a normal operation mode to drive the system output. SMART employs this technique
to provide efficient repair so that the system can continue to provide the highest possible
performance while being repaired.

3. Time-multiplexing of different applications on the same FPGA greatly benefits organic
systems, which normally require adaptive and flexible design practices, such as changing
the functionality of the hardware during certain stages of the mission to support another
application or other operational modes. Different bitstreams for different applications can
be stored and downloaded whenever the mission demands their use.

4. Reconfiguration capability facilitates organic repair through evolutionary algorithms.
Reconfigurability allows for testing the fitness of individuals on the hardware, and also
enables direct evolution of the most compact presentation of the circuit, which is the
Configuration Bit Stream (CBS) that stores the logic and routing configuration of the user
circuit. Both Intrinsic fitness evaluation and direct CBS evolution are not possible in
ASIC because the hardware logic and routing cannot be changed after fabrication. The

4

OGA that we implement in this work has many properties that are made possible due to
the reconfigurability of the underlying hardware, as discussed in Section 4.2.3

5. Reconfigurable systems based on FPGAs also have the option to integrate flexible softcore processors such as Microblaze on the same fabric with the application hardware,
which provides an opportunity to implement a complete SoC application. High-end
FPGA boards are also equipped with embedded cores such as PowerPC that interface
with the FPGA and control its reconfigurability via the Internal Configuration Access
Port (ICAP).

6. A multitude of computing and memory resources such as High-Speed Digital Signal
Processing (DSP) blocks operating at high speeds, block RAMs, FIFOs, and other builtin hardware logic are available on today‟s FPGAs to provide many options for a broad
range of applications and accelerated implementations of commonly used image
processing, arithmetic, communication, and encryption applications

7. Reconfigurable logic provides the option to change the clock frequency for a select part
of the fabric at run time through the use of the built-in Digital Clock Manager (DCM)
block. Therefore, an OC system can optimize the power usage for an application to meet
mission requirements.

Despite of all the aforementioned advantages, using FPGA devices rather than their ASIC
counterparts in mission-critical applications is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they
allow the support of self-x capabilities through reconfiguration. On the other hand, such
5

capabilities can introduce new fault vulnerabilities to the hardware. Transient faults, which
commonly occur as a Single Event Upset (SEU) [7] are a primary source of concern when
deploying SRAM-based devices in mission-critical applications such as space applications [8].
SEUs can occur when a charged particle impacts the silicon substrate with enough energy to
incur either a transient pulse in a combinational logic or a state flip in a sequential circuit. The
former is only articulated if a state storage component, such as a Flip-Flop, is affected by the
transient signal. Hence, the effect of SEU on combinational logic in ASICs could vanish without
any repairs. On the other hand, SEUs hitting memory cells are more likely to cause damage
because they flip the state of a stored bit, which affects the system until the relevant Flip-Flop is
loaded with a new correct value.

In SRAM-based FPGAs, where even the combinational logic is implemented using SRAM LookUp Tables (LUTs), SEUs gain amplified importance as every SEU is a state-flip that can affect
both the sequential and the combinational logic. To this end, space-qualified versions of SRAMbased FPGAs are commercially available for mitigating SEUs at the circuit level such as Xilinx‟s
QPro [6], Indeed, a new field of research that targets fault tolerance in reconfigurable platforms
has emerged [6] to take advantage of the inherent reconfigurability of FPGAs. In conjunction
with the use of high reliability components, mission-critical applications can benefit from PR to
survive the various sources of failures that might affect reconfigurable resources.

6

1.3. Contributions of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, we introduce SMART, a novel fault-tolerance technique exhibiting many
advantages over the manufacturer‟s current standardized fault handling method, which is the
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) Technique. SMART provides Adaptive Modular
Redundancy (AMR), in contrast to the fixed one in TMR, by exploiting the reconfigurability
property of the FPGA devices [9]. Moreover, SMART provides handling for hard-faults which
are seldom considered in self-repair techniques due to their supposed rareness. We demonstrate
via standard evaluation metrics and actual reported fault rates that hard-fault repair is needed to
provide sustainable mission operations in harsh environments. Moreover, not just that SMART
provides improved availability; it does it in a resource-aware fashion by optimizing energy
consumption and area usage.

1.3.1. Design and Implementation of SMART
In this work, we present the design and implementation of SMART, a two-layered sustainable
autonomic architecture for fault handling. The autonomous hardware layer is implemented on a
Virtex-4 Xilinx XC4VSX35 FPGA device [10], while the software layer is intended to be on a
PowerPC embedded core with ICAP interface to the FPGA device to download different CBSs
for repair purposes. In this work, in order to facilitate testing and verification, the software layer
resides on a host PC that is connected to the FPGA via a Xilinx parallel cable IV. SMART is
inspired by the OC paradigm, and thus the emergence of self-x properties is observed at the
system level after assembling the individual parts into a single, integrated, fault-tolerant system.
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The hardware layer implements a decentralized observer/controller processing loop to adjust the
configuration of the system based on real-time mission information. It accomplishes this task
using a novel general-purpose redundancy scheme called RARS [11] which does not have a
predetermined number of redundant modules like other fixed redundancy schemes commonly
found in the literature such as Duplex, TMR, and pair-and-spare. [12, 13]. Instead, RARS can
reconfigure its components at run-time to provide the appropriate level of redundancy that
matches the mission status. The distributed controller function in RARS, which is called the
Autonomic Element (AE), monitors the status of the redundant parts that implement the user
application, called the Functional Elements (FEs), and collects the reports from various sensors
to make decisions about which configuration to select. Having multiple RARS modules
facilitates the decentralization of the organic layer while reducing single points of failure.

RARS is a resource-conservative adaptive redundancy architecture that is only reconfigured to a
high power/area configuration when multiple instances of the FE are needed to identify, mask, or
repair faults. Other approaches like TMR run in triplex mode even when faults are not present,
consuming three times the simplex configuration resources only to provide fault-tolerance during
brief intervals of the mission lifetime during which the system is subject to faults. RARS saving
benefits will be shown analytically and experimentally in Chapter 6.

Still, the fault-tolerance of RARS is restricted by the limited capacity of the available hardware
to support alternative routing and/or logic for faulty parts. Therefore, a monitoring and
refurbishment layer that resides above the hardware layer serves two purposes. The first is to
collect the hardware status reports and render them into a human-readable format so that system
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operators can monitor the deployed system and interact with it. The second is to provide active
repair in the event of faults, either via scrubbing [13], which involves rewriting the configuration
memory with a fault-free CBS to correct any SEU occurrences in the configuration logic, or via a
dynamic refurbishment process for permanent faults using Evolvable Hardware (EHW)
approaches [14] .

The evolutionary approach employed in this work is a novel Genetic

Algorithm (GA) that implements design practices suiting the organic nature of the system and
thus is referred to as an Organic GA (OGA). The software layer reads the performance and status
of RARS and triggers the refurbishment procedures whenever the redundancy degree of RARS is
not adequate to mask the faults.

The two layers are connected via Xilinx Parallel Cable that connects between a standard Joint
Test Action Group (JTAG) [15] port on the FPGA and the parallel port on the host PC. On the
FPGA, the JTAG communicates with RARS via the General-Purpose Native JTAG Tester
(GNAT) [15] platform. The messages themselves are communicated using a special
communication protocol that was designed specifically for this system. This communication link
carries messages between the two layers as part of the fault-tolerance algorithm and also
transmits the CBS to reconfigure parts of the system as needed.

Dynamic PR is adopted to improve two aspects of the organic repair. First, it significantly
reduces the configuration time as compared to the full bitstream configuration approach due to
the small size of the bitstream. Second, it allows the system to remain online while its faulty
parts are being reconfigured; this helps increase the availability of the system by enabling it to
maintain functionality even during repair. Dynamic PR is used in two stages of the repair cycle.
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It is first used in the scrubbing stage when the AS are repetitively configured on the FPGA
searching for a spare that exclude the faulty resource, and second, it is used by the OGA when
candidate solutions are reconfigured on the FPGA for fitness evaluation.

In this work, we implement the well-known Sobel edge detection [16] application on the
hardware layer to illustrate the organic self-healing, self-configuring, and self-monitoring
capabilities of RARS. In addition, we implement the software layer and connect it to the circuit
on the FPGA through the JTAG port. This layer is shown to successfully monitor and supervise
the organic hardware layer and also performs evolutionary refurbishment of faulty modules.

After combining all modules into one integrated fault-tolerant platform, we scrutinized the
system behavior while processing a real-time video stream under various fault scenarios. The
hardware layer demonstrated emergent self-monitoring and self-reorganization properties that
allowed the system to sustain even in the presence of successive faults. When the number of
faults exceeded the capabilities of the hardware layer, the higher-level software layer augmented
the response through self-reconfiguration and self-healing.

1.3.2. Autonomous Fault-Tolerance Technique to Improve Availability
Figure 1 depicts the high-level view of SMART‟s repair methods and the various events that
trigger their executions. The central state of SMART operation is the fault-free operation (1) that
requires only RARS‟s self-monitoring techniques to detect the occurrence of faults. An SEU can
impact the FPGA resources and cause a single bit flip in one of the LUTs. This LUT may fall
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either on the data path of the application, i.e., a user register that stores an intermediate
calculation value, or on the logic path, i.e., an LUT that is programmed to implement the
intended circuit functionality. SEUs that affect LUTs in the user logic can be overwritten by
subsequent operations without any repair interventions. This type of fault is classified as
transient, and normally fades away in the regular execution cycle. The transient effect can be
masked with redundancy techniques (2) until the fault is corrected.

However, if the soft fault affects an LUT in the reconfigurable logic, then the bit flip will remain
manifested until the unlikely event of another SEU impacting the exact same location. A bit flip
in the logic path can be more harmful to the application because it changes the truth-table content
of the affected LUT and thus alters the behavior of the circuit. This type of SEUs cannot be
ameliorated in subsequent operations because the affected element is not written by the user
application; thus, it must be explicitly re-written by reloading the correct CBS via scrubbing (3).

Next, consider if radiation leads to pathways for electro-migration and accelerated aging effects
[17]. This type of Local Permanent Damage (LPD) can be modeled as a stuck-at fault at one of
the LUT inputs. Unfortunately, scrubbing techniques that rewrite the CBS contents will at best
give up after a number of retries or at worst may usurp the mission, taking the device offline to
repeatedly attempt to overwrite a permanent fault. In that case, a permanent fault handling
technique is required to circumvent the stuck-at faulty resource and thus repair the user
application.

11

The self-configuration of spares via AS (4), aims to avoid the faulty resource by consecutively
reconfiguring the faulty FE with design-time pre-seeded bitfiles, each of which exclusively
avoids a set of LUTs in the physical FE area. By doing so, SMART searches the set of spares for
one spare that can hide the fault by not using the broken LUT. Carrying spares is a common
technique for fault-tolerance due to its simplicity and quickness, it is limited though to the
number of carried spares, and cannot actually adapt at run-time to handle fault-scenarios that
were not accounted for at design-time when the spares where configured.

As a remedy, SMART adds one last-resort repair mechanism that is invoked when all other
techniques fail to repair faults. This technique is the evolutionary OGA (5) repair that is not
restricted by the number of spares or any other design-time considerations. Instead, it can
heuristically search for alternative circuits that can bypass the faulty resource and thus produce
the expected output. Such technique can sometimes be slow or unpredictable, but the fact that it
is delayed to the very end of the repair cycle makes it a much better alternative to conceding to
downgraded level of operation.

12

(2)
Redundancy
(RARS)

Soft fault in user logic
(Transient Fault)

Voting
Hard fault in
configuration logic

(1)
Fault-Free Operation
(RARS)
Soft fault in
configuration logic

(3)
Scrubbing
(SMART)

Flipped CBS
bit is
corrected

Available
spares can
hide the fault

No available
spares to
hide the fault

(4)
Amorphous
Resources
(SMART)

(5)
OGA
(SMART)

Refurbishment through
evolutionary repair

Figure 1: High-level Operational View of SMART Repair Methods

1.3.3. Evaluating Self-Regulation of Availability, Area, and Energy
The first evaluation metric that we perform is reliability assessment of SMART compared to
conventional TMR and scrubbing techniques that choose to ignore hard faults handling due to
their rareness. To accomplish this, we model RARS as a Continuous-time Markov Chain
(CTMC), providing transition probabilities of soft and hard fault rates based on publically
available fault-measurement data, and soft and hard repair rates based on experimental results of
SMART prototype. We present a full factorial experiment with nine levels based on three levels
of each MTTF and MTTR of the hard faults, where each experiments consists of Monte Carlo
simulations for the fault and repair levels to calculate various reliability and availability metrics
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that can help shedding light on the significance of hard fault repair in fault-tolerance systems.
Details on availability analysis using CTMC can be found in section 6.2.2.

After we experimentally established the benefits of SMART on the availability of missioncritical systems in space applications, we shifted the focus to assessing SMART‟s power and
area considerations as a real engineering platform. For that, we used the standard BYU-LANL
Triple Modular Redundancy (BL-TMR) [18] toolset to create triplicated designs of the image
processing Sobel edge detector use case that we evaluated SMART against. The BL-TMR tool is
a Java-based project that relies on the platform-independent Electronic Design Interchange
Format (EDIF) [18] files to automatically insert redundancy, such as duplication and triplication,
into digital designs. We chose four voter insertion options times seven voter insertion algorithms
to design twenty eight BL-TMR triplicated edge detectors benchmarks. We used Xilinx mapping
reports to extract the area overhead of each benchmark, and Xilinx Power Analyzer (XPA) [19]
tool to calculate the dynamic power of the benchmarks. We then compared the twenty eight
benchmarks to RARS in term of power and area to demonstrate the benefits of utilizing PR in
FPGA-based fault-tolerance applications. The experimental setup and results are documented in
section 6.3.2.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK

In this chapter, we present literature survey for previous works of the dissertation. The previous
work is classified into technology related work and application related work, where the former
deals with reconfigurable devices and their susceptibility to faults, while the latter focuses on the
various fault-tolerance methods and their applications.

2.1. Device Technology Related Work

2.1.1. Role of Reconfigurable Devices in Space Mission-Critical Applications
Hardware devices are commonly viewed as fixed-functionality devices as they are rendered for
specific application at fabrication time and cannot be changed after that. However, the main
benefit of FPGA devices is reconfigurability, as the fabrication will only create a programmable
platform that can be configured -and often reconfigured- by the end user, to realize various
functionalities at runtime.

FPGAs are seas of programmable logic blocks that are highly interconnected through other
programmable hierarchal communication switches. FPGAs can be made of anti-fuse technology,
which allows single device programming, or SRAM cells that allows any number of device
programming operations [6]. The focus of this dissertation is on SRAM-FPGAs because
SMART relies on the reconfigurability feature to realize fault-tolerance with reduced power and
area overhead.
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SRAM-FPGA devices allow both logic and interconnect to be programmed by downloading a
CBS that represents the desired circuit functionality. The generation of the CBS is normally
automated through the usage of software tools, like Xilinx ISE pack [20], that read the design in
schematic or Hardware Definition Languages (HDL) formats, and then transform the design into
native bitfiles to program the target devices. Thus, FPGAs are considered a suitable platform for
prototyping because they can be instantly programmed with the desired hardware functionality
without going through the complicated, lengthy, process of fabrication in ASICs.

Therefore, FPGA Devices have been widely used in space mission-critical applications for
different purposes. For example, Europa mission [21] designers intend to use FPGA devices as a
prototyping platform during the development phase, then based on a specially-designed flow, the
prototype will be implemented on radiation-hardened ASIC devices for the actual mission
deployment. Other missions will use FPGA devices in the actual deployment, whereas others are
intended to test SRAM-FPGA resilience to SEU‟s. Table 1 shows a list of actual space missions
that utilize FPGAs in their operations, along with the deployment timeframe, and the intended
use of the FPGAs. The various mission reported in the table demonstrate the important role of
FPGA devices in such domain, and thus justify the direction toward fault-tolerance in FPGA in
research and industry.
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Table 1: Mission-Critical Space Applications Employing FPGA Devices
Satellite Name
FedSat (Australia CRCSS) [22]

Cibola (USA-Los
Alamos) [23]
SmartSat-1 (Japan –
NICT) [24]
Space-Based
Reconfigurable
Supercomputer [25]
Venus Express [26]
NASA New Dawn [26]
Mars Rover (JPL) [27]
Europa [21]
ARTEMIS
Reconfigurable Payload
Processor (Responsive
Space Missions) [28]

Year
Deployed
2002

2007
2008
Future

20052012
20072015
Many
20202029
Many

Application
Remote Sensing: Control Logic, Classifier, Predictor, Encoder.
Contains Actel FPGA for pre-filtering, Xilinx FPGA for data
acquisition and synchronizations, another Xilinx FPGA device
for data decoding.
Nine Xilinx Virtex FPGA devices used for sensor-processing
and SEU studies (soft faults monitoring and mitigation)
Seven XC2VP4 Xilinx FPGAs implementing
Modulation/demodulation function (2 kbps -2 Mbps)
Xilinx Virtex-4, Atmel AT697 radiation-hardened, SPARC
processor. Supercomputers that can achieve 1,000 GOPs, weigh
40 pounds, and consume only 80 watts
Two radiation-hardened Xilinx Virtex-1 FPGA devices to
implement Venus Monitoring Camera (VMC).
Improved on Framing Cameras (VMC) that was used in Venus
Xilinx Virtex FPGA has been used in DC motor controller in the
rover
FPGAs are used in prototyping, then the final design will be
implemented on Rad-Hard ASIC devices for the actual mission
RA-RCC (Reconfigurable Computers) using 3 Virtex-4
(V4LX160) FPGAs

2.1.2. Failure Modes and Their Effects
Using FPGA devices comes at the expense of increased fault rate compared to ASIC-based
devices. In the space environment, SRAM-based FPGAs can be affected by either radiationinduced or aging-related faults [29]. Radiation-induced faults can be either non-destructive
(soft) or destructive (hard). Aging Faults on the other hand are almost always destructive, which
means that the fault cannot be recovered by rewriting the CBS. Regardless of the fault types, the
application should be prepared to autonomously recover from the faults due to the limited human
intervention in space missions. This section will provide taxonomy of the various fault types that
can affect FPGA devices in space, and the common methods of dealing with them.
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Radiation can cause one of the following two failure modes in FPFA devices [30]:

1- Single Event Effect (SEE): Effect caused by single energetic sub-atomic particle strike,
this is a random event that does not directly depend on cumulative effects. SEEs can
result in two type of faults:

a. Non-destructive SEU: This is a state-flip of an SRAM cell that is caused by the
SEE [7]. It is non-destructive in the sense that the flipped bit can be restored by
rewriting the cell‟s content with the correct value. SEUs can happen in the
configuration logic or the user logic. The configuration logic is what defines the
FPGA circuit behavior; the only way to correct SEUs in this logic is to rewrite the
flipped cell with a new value via scrubbing. However, SEUs in the user logic fall
on the datapath, and thus can be corrected by subsequent writes to the same user
register.

b. Destructive Single Event Latch-up (SEL): Occurs when an energetic charged
particle causes excessive supply power to destruct the memory cell [30]. This
destruction is permanent and cannot be restored by rewriting the CBS like in the
previous SEU case.

2- Total Ionizing Dose (TID): Cumulative damage caused by protons and electrons hitting
the silicon substrate for long times. TIDs are almost always destructive.
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To Summarize, radiation can cause destructive faults through TID faults or SEEs that get
manifested as SELs. More commonly, radiation will cause non-destructive SEEs in the forms of
SEUs.

Numerous fault-tolerance systems in the literature have neglected permanent fault handling in
FPGA devices [31]. The reason behind this choice is that many resources in research and
industry have claimed that Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs are immune to radiation-induced
destructive hard faults. No SEL was reported during experiments when SRAM-based FPGAs
were exposed to the maximum tested Linear Energy Transfer (LET) of tens of MeV cm2/mg
[29]. Xilinx Virtex family was also found immune against TID effect of up to 300 krad in [32].
Moreover, The introduction of epitaxial CMOS fabrication process in Virtex devices resulted in
TID immunity of >100 krad and SEL immunity of LET > 120 MeV cm2/mg [33].

Therefore, conventional fault-tolerance approaches targeting SRAM-based FPGA devices in
space applications have disregarded hard-faults tolerance [31]. Instead, they focused on
mitigating SEU faults in the data path using redundancy techniques, such as TMR, to mask the
transient effect of the user registers bit flips [34], and implementing scrubbing techniques to
overwrite SEUs in the configuration logic [35]. Xilinx devices have shown high tolerance to SEL
and TID, thus SEU remains as the main concern in space-mission that use FPGA devices [33].

Nonetheless, in this work, we contradict the aforementioned mainstream hypothesis by asserting
that permanent faults cannot be ignored in mission-critical applications because of the following
reasons:
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1. With the continuous effort to shrink the feature size in VLSI devices, the impact of agingrelated (wear out) faults such as Time-Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB) will
significantly increase to levels that cannot be ignored [36]. TDDB depends on the
operating temperature of the device, and the gate oxide thickness that shrinks with
smaller process technologies. The charge trapped in the thin oxide layer keeps increasing
until it reaches the threshold of breakdown; this effect is imminent for aggressively
scaled technologies operating in thermally stressful environments. The resulting fault is
destructive, meaning that the SRAM cell cannot be reconfigured to amend the fault
effect.

2. Local Permanent Damage (LPD) is reported by [17] due to SELs or SEUs that cannot be
corrected without system reset. This type of LPDs is manifested as hard faults in systems
that cannot tolerate full system restart.

3. Radiation testing is not guaranteed to exactly replicate space environment. Also no FPGA
has been tested for more than 15 years, whereas space mission can go for more than that
[17]

4. Xilinx publicly reports that TDDB can start to happen in as little as 3 years in an XC3S
4000/5000 90-nm SRAM-based FPGA devices under a temperature of 125C [37].

5. Recently published work reported TDDB impacting 10% of total LUTs every year [36]
in aggressive thermal conditions, based on Xilinx data referenced above. Other recently
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published work reported TDDB MTTF of 476 days for a 2206-slice circuit on 150nm
technology [29].

Therefore, we believe that it is not the best engineering practice to blindly ignore hard faults
especially in multi-million mission-critical applications that needs to be equipped with inherent
tolerance to any type of destructive events. Thus, we present the design and implementation of a
generic autonomous fault-tolerance system that can handle both soft and hard faults, followed by
evaluation metrics to demonstrate the benefits of such system compared to conventional TMR
and scrubbing systems, in term of availability, power, and area

2.2. Application Related Work
This section surveys previous researches that present various fault-tolerance methods, successful
prototypes and implementations of OC systems, and the application of GA as a repair method.

2.2.1. Fault Tolerance in Reconfigurable Devices
FPGAs are popular platforms for reconfigurable computing applications especially pertaining to
the field of embedded systems [38]. Run-time partial reconfiguration has many advantages, such
as time-multiplexing different functionality designs to save power and resources without losing
the basic functionality of the application [39, 40], and supporting adaptive architectures that
scales based on resources availability and mission requirements to achieve improved algorithm
performance while reducing power consumption [41].
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The ability to perform partial reconfiguration for local and remote system has opened new
domains in fault-tolerant hardware designs, especially for space applications [6]. These
applications are susceptible to faults due to the harsh operating environments along with
difficult, if not impossible, human intervention. Thus, runtime partial reconfiguration has been
successfully utilized to autonomously repair faulty systems, and compensate for the absence of
human intervention.

One of the most common techniques for mitigating unwanted configuration memory changes is
scrubbing [17, 42]. Scrubbing involves overwriting of the configuration memory at periodic
intervals with a configuration that is known to be fault-free. Moreover, this process can be
augmented by reading back the configuration memory and comparing it with a configuration that
is known to be good to isolate the erroneous frame(s) so that they can be re-written using PR.
Scrubbing techniques fail when the stored configuration is damaged or when the fault is caused
by permanent hardware resource failures, in which case more elaborate repair techniques
targeting permanent faults are needed, such as the evolutionary repair algorithm presented in [15]
and in this work.

Table 2 presents a comparison between SMART and other prominent fault-tolerance techniques.
All surveyed techniques, except conventional TMR, employ some form of fault recovery
mechanism to restore the original fault-free system status. TMR is a passive technique which
employs spatial voting to mask the faults. The area and power overhead for the TMR approach is
three times the area and power overhead associated with a single module (O FE) plus the overhead
associated with the voting logic (OV).
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Table 2: Comparison between SMART and Other Prominent Fault-Tolerance Approaches
Approach
TMR
Vigander
[14]
Lach [43]

STARS
[44]
Garvie [17]
Keymeulen
[45]

SMART

Fault Handling
Method
Spatial Voting
Spatial voting and
offline evolutionary
refurbishment
Design-time fine
grain redundancy
based reconfiguration
Online BIST
Spatial Voting and
online (1+1) ES
Design-time
population based
fault insensitive
designs
Adaptive
redundancy,
diversity-based
configurations, OGA

Fault Detection
Hard
Latency
faults
Negligible
No

Resource Coverage
Logic
Comparator

Power overhead
Area cost

Yes

No

3*OFE + OV

Negligible

No

Yes

No

3*OFE + OV + OGA

Not
addressed

No

Yes

Not
addressed

Fault detection
mechanism is not
addressed

Depends
on
geometry
of device

Yes

Yes

Yes

OFE +
Reconfiguration
controller

Negligible

Yes

Yes

No

3*OFE + OV + OGA

Not
addressed

No

Yes

Not
addressed

Fault detection
mechanism is not
addressed

Negligible

Yes

Yes

No

Analyzed in Section
6.3

Vigander [14] presents an offline genetic algorithm refurbishment technique to handle hard
faults. All the modules are simulated with faults representing a worst-case scenario, and the
evolution-based refurbishment is performed on all three modules for recovery. The overhead
associated with the GA based repair is represented as O GA. This cost can be used to include all
GA based control mechanisms, and the spare resource allocated for the GA-based refurbishment.

Lach [43] on the other hand presents a technique based on design-time allocation of fine-grain
spares at the Configurable Logic Blocks (CLB) level. One CLB is allocated as spare for a designtime defined group of CLBs, and multiple configurations are generated such that one fault can be
tolerated in each group. Average Area overhead of the chosen benchmarks is 5.4%, which is
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considerably less than the TMR. This scheme however does not include any fault detection
mechanism.

STARS [44] employs run-time Built-In Self Testing (BIST) by roving across the FPGA fabric.
This technique covers fault detection, isolation and repair with minimal application area
overhead. Dynamic PR has also been used in this approach to facilitate downloading the tested
regions onto the fabric. Still, the time to detect a fault can be quiet high and as much as 8.5M
erroneous outputs may be produced before being able to detect the fault [46]. Further, the fault
detection process employs continuous reconfiguration and thus incurs huge power overhead, and
potentially causes performance degradation due to clock stoppage, even when the system is faultfree.

Garvie [17] employs spatial TMR for masking the fault and an evolutionary strategy to refurbish
the identified faulty module. The power and area overhead of this technique can be essentially
considered same as that of TMR. The work concludes that hard-fault tolerance is essential for
fault-tolerance of FPGA devices in harsh-environment deployments.

Keymeulen [45] introduces an evolutionary-based method to generate a population of individuals
at design time that are resilient to a set of predetermined type of faults according to the planned
mission. This design-time process is tested by employing the design-time generated
configurations to overcome the expected fault pattern at run-time. This scheme requires
accommodating all possible faults at design-time.
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2.2.2. Organic Computing Approaches
Related works in the literature have explored techniques useful for the development of an OC
system from various theoretical and practical perspectives. A frequent focus among these has
been the design of OC architectures and development methodologies for systems with the
potential to exhibit increased reliability and sustainability.

For example, in [47], the run-time reliability of System-on-a-Chip (SoC) architectures was
evaluated. The objective was to design SoCs that can adapt to environmental changes and
unpredictable failure scenarios by introducing dynamic reliability, power management, and
security tradeoffs. The implementation included five-stage RISC pipeline architecture with
globally-accessible error counters in fixed time intervals. This technique addressed selfmonitoring in SoC applications with redundant parts; we expand on this by presenting a novel
OC system that not only provides self-monitoring capability, but also self-repair and selfadaptation for increased reliability yet with reduced power consumption than conventional
redundancy techniques.

In [48], an Observer/Controller architecture was developed to provide a generic template to
design control architectures for OC systems without extension to a hardware prototype
implementation. This organic framework mainly targeted self-organization in a simulated
environment and recommended thorough empirical studies of OC systems in different
application domains. We extend on these concepts and investigate more self-x properties in reallife application of an edge detection circuit running in error-prone environments.
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In [49], an organic computing paradigm called “marching-pixels” targeting future CMOS camera
chips is presented. This paradigm relies on a massive fine-grain processor array to autonomously
execute image pre-processing tasks, such as center detection and the tracking of moving objects.
The organic concept stems from the fact that each pixel that falls on the detection path (e.g.,
edge, center, moving object, and so on) can be the origin or birth of a virtual organic object,
which can then travel through a grid of identical PEs where it may die or join other pixels. The
C-based simulator used to demonstrate “marching-pixels” confirmed the emergence of selforganization and self-healing in software simulated CMOS environment.

In [5], the role of middleware that acts between the hardware system and the application software
is discussed for OC systems based on dynamically reconfigurable FPGAs. A scalable data flowdriven virtual machine (SDVM) is introduced. It is able to schedule parallel computing
assignments to a set of reconfigurable and heterogeneous processing elements on a FPGA. The
middleware is also able to dynamically balance the workload of the entire system in order to
optimize power management and cope with faults. To demonstrate the advantages of SDVM, the
Romberg numerical integration algorithm is implemented on the FPGA where the soft cores are
used as processing elements. The results show the speedups achieved by executing the task on a
variable number of processing elements as allocated by the middleware; a comparison is
conducted with respect to sequential execution. Furthermore, self-organization and selfoptimization are investigated in the experimental work, with less emphasize on self-repair due to
the nature of the application. SMART on the other hand targets hardware sustainability in
mission critical applications; with the main emphasize being self-repair and self-optimization of
power consumption.
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In robotic applications a control architecture for a robot based on organic computing principles is
presented in [50]. Decentralized control is shown to achieve the global objective of movement
for a six-legged platform. The platform is also able to manage the failure of a node through its
local rules and demonstrate sustainability in a mechanical environment.

More generally, in [51], Digital on-demand Computing Organism (DoDOrg) targeting real-time
systems is presented. The system model is based on biological principles to achieve the desired
self-x properties; it is divided into processing cells representing human cell analogs, middleware
control representing organ analogs, and high-level control representing brain analog. The system
is based on heterogeneous mix of computing elements, including standard elements such as
CPUs and reconfigurable cells. The work presents an approach to organic computing that shows
many of its desired self-x properties along with power management demonstrated using a robotcontroller example. While the viability of this system is shown in a simulated environment, the
transfer to a real robot system is sought in a later phase. In our work, we aspire from and extend
on the significant self-x properties demonstrated in DoDOrg robot simulation by using an actual
FPGA implementation of edge detection circuit, where the OC paradigm demonstrates powerconservative fault-tolerance through adaptive redundancy and software monitoring and
refurbishment of the reconfigurable logic.

In an attempt to practically realize DoDOrg on FPGAs, a framework to achieve a decentralized
configuration and power management scheme is shown in [4]. This work considers FPGAs as
the most viable computing platform for OC systems due to the enormous benefits of
reconfigurability. However, the work identifies the centralized nature of the FPGA‟s ICAP as the
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main contradiction to the crucial decentralized requirement of OC systems. Therefore, a platform
in which each computing node can autonomously and independently request its reconfiguration
through the ICAP is presented. Similarly, power consumption is managed individually by each
node at run-time to attain the desired virtual decentralization of the ICAP. Though this work does
not present a complete implementation of an OC system, it does point toward the idea that
FPGAs can serve as a viable computing platform for these systems. In the experimental setup,
each computing node is autonomously and independently able to request its reconfiguration
through the ICAP. Similarly, power consumption is managed individually by each node at runtime.

2.2.3. Genetic Algorithm Techniques
Evolutionary Algorithms are a family of intelligent, heuristic, search algorithms that are inspired
by the Darwinian theory of natural evolution. Darwin‟s famous theory about the natural selection
of the fittest individuals and the recombination of their genetic material to produce yet better
individuals is imitated in the evolutionary algorithms.

2.2.3.1.Standard GA Techniques
One of the widely used types of evolutionary algorithms is the Genetic Algorithm (GA). GA is an
adaptive heuristic search based on initial set of individuals, called population; the selection
process favors a subset of this population that shows better fitness according to a predefined
function called the fitness function. This function must accurately quantify what a good solution
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is for the problem in hand. Each individual is encoded into a genetic representation of the
solution, called chromosome, which contain one or many blocks, each called a gene, which
encodes a single physical trait of the individual. Once the fittest individuals in a generation are
selected based on their fitness function, a set of genetic operators are applied on them to produce
different chromosomes that might yield better solutions. The Genetic operators vary in their
nature and usage, but two of them are used in almost all GA implementations, namely crossover
and mutation.

Crossover is the recombination of genetic material to produce new chromosomes; the content of
the genetic material is preserved, but only shuffled probabilistically hoping that this reshuffling
could lead to the juxtaposition of some genes in such a way to increase the fitness of the
offspring. Mutation on the other hand, is a probabilistic change in the chromosome to introduce
new traits, this is similar to mutations in nature which produces better or worse individuals, but
under any case, the selection pressure can pick the useful mutations and ignore the harmful ones
by measuring the mutation impact on each individual.

Once the selected individuals are genetically operated, they get replaced into the population and
another round of the algorithm is executed. In general, this approach is shown to converge into
better fit solutions, based on the exploitation of the selection process and the exploration of the
genetic operators.

Figure 2 depicts the GA process in a flow chart. The power of GA comes from the contradicting
forces of exploitation and exploration [52]; the GA exploits the best solutions by picking them in
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the selection process which favors the fittest individuals, then explores these selected solutions
by recombining their genetic material and introducing limited randomness into them, in order to
produce more diversity into the population.
Generation of initial population

Fitness evaluation based on
the fitness function

NO

Selection of the fittest
individuals

Recombination of selected
individuals (Crossover)

Mutation of selected
individuals

Selection Process: GA’s
way of exploiting the fit
individuals in the search
process

GA operators: Exploring
new solutions derived form
the best individuals in the
population

Placement of offspring into
new generation

Termination criteria
met?

YES

Get solution

Figure 2: Genetic Algorithm Flow Chart

30

There are two paradigms for implementing GA in reconfigurable applications: Extrinsic
evolution via functional models that abstract the physical aspects of the real device, and intrinsic
evolution on the actual devices. It is evident that extrinsic approaches simplify the evolution
process as they operate on software models of the FPGAs.

For applications like fault handling in deep space missions, not all fault types can be readily
accommodated by software models. Additionally, abstracting the physical aspects of the target
device complicates rendering the final designs into actual on-board circuits, for instance,
limitations such as routability of the design cannot be ensured until the final stages of the
configuration process. For these reasons, intrinsic evolution can provide a direct approach to
realizing physical designs for a specific FPGA device.

Several previous research efforts have addressed intrinsic evolution. A successful attempt on
Field Programmable Transistor Array (FPTA) chips was implemented by [53]. FPTAs are
transistor-level programmable devices configured by controlling the status of programmable
switches interconnecting array of transistors. The work proposed new ideas for long-term
hardware reliability using evolvable hardware techniques via an evolutionary design tool, called
EHWPack, which facilitates intrinsic evolution by incorporating PGAPack genetic engine with
Labview test-bed running on UNIX workstation. Digital XNOR Gate on two connected FPTA
boards was intrinsically evolved.

Miller [54] addressed the importance of direct evolution on the Xilinx 6216 FPGA devices; the
research explored the effect of the device physical constraints on evolving digital circuits. A
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mapping between the representation genotype and the device phenotype was proposed, however,
no implementation details were presented.

In [55], a Multilayer Runtime Reconfiguration Architecture (MRRA) framework illustrates the
concept of a communication and reconfiguration interface with an embedded System-on-Chip
(SoC). This modular architecture has a hierarchical framework to support different functionalities
as each functional layer can do its job independently of other working layers. It provides the
logic, translation and reconfiguration layers with standardized interfaces for communication
between these layers and the FPGA-based SoC. The bitstream was directly manipulated to
efficiently realize different logic by modifying the content and/or reallocating the LUTs.
SMART uses an enhanced version of MRRA based intrinsic evolution platform and introduces
direct bitstream manipulation for Xilinx Virtex 4 devices as compared to Xilinx Virtex II Pro
devices.

In this work, we test SMART using Sobel edge-detection algorithm on reconfigurable logic.
There are various applications of edge-detection with main emphasis on identifying boundaries
in an image; it is used for object recognition and quality monitoring in industrial applications,
medical imaging applications such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) , Ultrasound [56] and
it is used for satellite imaging applications [57]. Numerous efforts have been made to accelerate
this computationally expensive algorithm on specialized hardware using conventional design
techniques [58-61]. Research has also been done on designing edge-detectors using evolutionary
techniques [56, 62, 63]. A comparison between SMART edge-detection evolution results and the
other edge-detection evolution techniques is shown in Table 11.
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2.2.3.2.Parallel GA Techniques
Traditional GA techniques have demonstrated outstanding capabilities in solving complex
optimization problem since their introduction back in the 1970‟s. However, engineering and
scientific applications have increasingly grown in complexity and criticality, demanding better
solutions yet within strict optimization constraints such as time, cost, and power. For that, the
research community targeted improving the GA performance in order to suit the nature of these
complex mission critical applications. The most noticeable effort to improve on the SGA is the
introduction of Parallel Genetic Algorithms (PGA).

PGA adopts a divide-and-conquer approach to split the problems into pieces and thus exploits
multiple processors to enhance the convergence time [64]. Among the many PGA subclasses that
have emerged, Island-Based Genetic Algorithm (IGA) has been heavily studied and implemented
in various scholar and practical domains.

IGA consists of several semi-isolated islands or demes, each of which hosts an independent GA
implementation that runs in parallel with other demes‟ GAs. The islands exchange individuals
from time to time in an effort to increase the chance of finding a better global solution. The IGA
can apply global parameters, such as mutation rate, crossover rate, population size, to all islands
or vary them across islands. IGA introduces new set of parameters such as the number of islands,
the island topology, the migration rate, and the migration policy. Even though IGA appears to be
a straight juxtaposition of many simple GA runs, the emergent behavior caused by speciation and
migration entirely suits the organic theme of the OGA that we presented in this work.
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The benefits of the IGA are many; some of them are listed below:

1- Understandability and Inherent Technical Support: IGA is the most popular approach
among all PGA types [64]. This is partly attributed to the relative ease of this approach
and its compatibility with the coarse-grain parallel computing paradigm.

2- Speedup and Quality of Solution: Many research efforts have shown the advantage of
using IGA over SGA and other Parallel GA approaches [65-73]

3- More Diversified Population: Spatial distribution of individuals across multiple islands
and allowing them to interact only through limited migrations will effectively reduce the
chance that the best individuals take over the population rapidly and direct the GA toward
local optima in the early stages of the search [74]

4- Closer Analogy to Natural Evolution: Although not necessarily an advantage, some
advocates of the biological inspiration of computation algorithms believe that IGA
represents a closer analogy to natural evolution, where the population is seldom a
panmictic one; there are usually many niches that evolve separately and occasionally
exchange individuals. [75]

5- Scalability and parallel-computation suitability: The effectiveness of IGA comes from the
fact that the inter-process communication is minimal and only limited to the migration
phase. Other Parallel GA paradigms, like a master-slave GA that distributes the selection
knowledge [76], require heavy communication between the nodes in order to pick the
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fittest among the entire population, this is not a problem in IGA as the selection process
is limited to each island‟s subpopulation, the only time inter-process communication
happens is when the individuals migrate, an event that sparsely occur in a traditional
IGA (1% of population every 1 generation is a common choice [72])

6- Linearly separable problems and multi-objective optimization: The fact that
subpopulations are evolved independently causes different islands to climb different
peaks in the search space, provided that the migration rate is not too high to cause
premature convergence for all islands. This finding amplifies the importance of IGA as it
makes it a good candidate for achieving multi-objective optimizations, which are widely
encountered in many scientific and engineering fields [77]

Examples of successful applications of IGA are shown in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Successful Applications of IGA
Application
Database search using PGA
Nuclear reactor optimization
Travelling Salesman
Royal Road functions (R1-R4)
DeJong test suites [67], Goldberg, Korb, and Deb‟s ugly 3-bit deceptive problem
[71], and the zero-one knapsack problem [68].
Total of eight functions:
Four functions (IM1-IM4) are specially created to test properties of IGA; three of
them require that islands cooperate to find a good solution.
The remaining four are standard multimodal test functions, which are:
Rosenbrock, Schwefel, Astrigin, and Griewangk.
Optimal design of elastic flywheels
Optimization fine spatial grid of water pipes for groundwater remediation (pumpand-treat technology)
Training a Recurrent Artificial Neural Network (RANN).
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CHAPTER 3: SMART DESIGN OBJECTIVES

In this section, we present the major design objectives of SMART. Each of these objectives,
listed in Table 4, is analyzed in terms of motivation and how it has been approached in other
studies; we then show the design decisions that each goal has prompted and how these decisions
were manifested in the actual system design.
Table 4: System Goals, Motivations, and Impacts
Objective
Exploit
Reconfigurability to
Realize Adaptive Level
of Redundancy
Develop Organically
Amenable Hard-Fault
Repair Techniques
Implement SMART and
Evaluate it Using Widely
Accepted Metrics

Motivation
tradeoff between reliability and overhead,
Incorporate run-time info in redundancy
decisions, make use of the reconfigurability of
the FPGA as an adaptation technique
Account for hard-fault possibilities in space
missions, Exploit reconfigurability to advance
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3.1. Exploit Reconfigurability to Realize Adaptive Level of Redundancy
Traditional reliability techniques often rely on the concept of redundancy. Redundancy is the
addition of resources, time and/or information beyond what is actually needed for normal system
operation in order to maintain functionality and performance when faults occur. The tradeoff
between overhead and reliability in redundant systems has been the focal interest of many
research efforts in the past few decades [6]. Consequently, many redundancy schemes have
emerged to support different reliability requirements. Some of the influential redundancy
schemes are as follows.
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1. TMR: This is a passive redundancy scheme that masks faults as they occur without
isolating the faulty parts. TMR consists of three functionally-identical modules that
perform the same task in tandem and a voter that outputs the majority vote of the three
modules [84]. If one module fails, the other two can still overrule its erroneous output
and maintain correct overall TMR output.

2. Duplex Configuration: Consists of two functional modules and a discrepancy detector
that keeps track of any discrepancy between the outputs of the modules. The system
should be able to tolerate a period of degraded operation until the fault is isolated and
recovered by other means.

3. Stand-by Sparing. In this system, one module drives the system operation, while the
others are hot spares in an idle state that are ready to be called into action. Cold spares, in
contrast, are kept shut down and thus do not consume power, but they do incur some
delay upon activation before they are able to replace the faulty module.

The tradeoff in all of these fault-handling systems is between increased system dependability and
the overhead associated with maintaining redundant parts. For instance, duplex systems maintain
one redundant element but cannot mask faults on the fly. Adding one module to a duplex system
makes it capable of masking faults via TMR techniques at the expense of extra area, power, and
cost. This compromise is usually hard to achieve at design time. Thus, a mission-level analysis is
used to determine appropriate tradeoffs.
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In addition, mission-critical applications are impacted by many parameters, some of which can
only be decided at run time. For example, an edge detector circuit is of extreme importance when
it is operating on a critical video stream, for example, of a moving object in a surveillance
recording; in these cases, it is usually necessary to quickly mask any faults that might occur
because any loss of detection capabilities is intolerable and can affect the overall mission
objectives. However, if the same edge detector is operating on a still scene in a surveillance
recording, then it might be possible for the system to tolerate some degradation in the output
because the generated image can still be analyzed later or simply omitted due to the lack of
action in the scene. TMR may be a wise choice in the former case, whereas a duplex
configuration might be a better option in the latter. This scenario is an example of a system that
shows changing reliability needs at different mission stages.

Whereas many other studies have constant redundancy level in their systems at design time [12,
34, 85-87], we sought an adaptive solution by deferring the decision regarding which level of
redundancy to support until the run time. Thus, the choice can be enhanced by mission-related
information and status to make it an efficient compromise between the desired reliability and the
associated overhead in terms of cost, size, power, and area. To facilitate this approach, we
implanted RARS with various innate levels of redundancy from which the AE can select at run
time based on the mission status and the desired reliability level.
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3.2. Develop Organically Amenable Hard-Fault Repair Techniques
OC research is usually more concerned about spotting and controlling the emergence of self-x
properties than emphasizing the underlying platforms and implementation details. Therefore, one
should question whether FPGAs are suitable platforms for hosting organic computing systems,
and if so, to what extent. We believe that these are fundamental questions that must be answered
to assert the validity of choosing FPGAs as the hosting platform for an OC system.

In Section 1.2, we listed seven reasons that justify the selection of FPGAs as a hosting platform
for SMART. Mainly, due to the ability to change the hardware realization of the system at any
point of time, we were able to add and remove hardware components to adapt for changing
mission requirements and fault scenarios, this feature would not be attainable on a fixed
hardware device like ASICs.

Guarding mission-critical systems against faults has been a major research and industry focus in
the past few decades [6]. Nevertheless, the extreme majority of these efforts have overlooked
hard-fault repair on the basis that new technological advancements have produced device
technologies that are immune to radiation-induced faults [33], overlooking the increased impact
of device scaling toward smaller technology nodes (sub 90nm) on the aging-related failure
modes. We have listed five reasons in Section 2.1.2 to rationalize our choice of considering hard
faults in SMART‟s repair techniques.

Therefore, a key SMART design objective is to exploit the reconfigurability feature of FPGA to
implement organically-amenable hard-fault repair techniques that can help extending the
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operational lifetime of mission-critical systems. These two techniques are the Amorphous Spares
(AS) and the Organic GA (OGA).

The AS concept stems from the fact that a spare for FPGA circuit implementation is nothing but
a reasonably-sized bitstream file, this is in contrast to carrying an actual hard spare that occupies
space and require dedicated swapping mechanism to replace faulty parts. AS on the other hand
only requires re-implementing the same hardware design by using different area constraints per
intended spare. The ability of PowerPC embedded processor to reconfigure the FPGA using the
ICAP makes the swapping mechanism a software-driven process. The next stage of AS is to
allow dynamic relocation of the bitstream to avoid suspected faulty resources in the FPGA
during the mission runtime.

The second organic technique to deal with hard-faults is the OGA. The GA is a non-deterministic
heuristic search that can lead to slow and partial convergence. In order to make SMART GA an
organically-amenable one, we narrowed down three aspects that stand in the way of
implementing a GA that is appropriate for an organic system comprised of reconfigurable
devices. These three aspects are fitness evaluation, genetic representation, and design of fitness
function. We devised solutions that can help realize the organic GA objective as follows.

1. Genetic representation: The process of encoding the physical traits of the application
(phenotype) into digital representations (genotype), and vice versa: decoding back the
digital representations into physical form. This selection can complicate the evolution
process as it is needed every time an individual is evaluated. The genetic operators are
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applied in a computer program that requires string or integer representation of the
individuals (called chromosomes), but the intrinsic fitness evaluation requires the
individual to be implemented as a physical circuit on the FPGA. SMART uses direct
bitstream evolution to solve this problem, where the most compact and innate
representation of the circuit, the CBS, is directly evolved by the OGA. This process is
described in details in Section 4.2.3.2.

2. Fitness evaluation: This is the process of measuring the fitness of the evolved individual.
The common technique is to model the hardware device and use the software model to
evaluate the fitness, this is called extrinsic fitness evaluation [14]. This method poses risk
of imprecise modeling especially with the complexities of capturing timing and physical
constraints. Relying on simulators of the hardware rather than the hardware itself is a
risky approach for mission-critical systems because the evolved solution in not
guaranteed to fit on the actual hardware. Thus, the OGA utilizes intrinsic fitness
evaluation method that employs the actual hardware in measuring the fitness of the
individuals. This technique will be described in Section 4.2.3.2.

3. Fitness function: GAs are inspired by Charles Darwin‟s theory of natural selection, which
is usually reduced to the motto “survival of the fittest”. In reality, nature is capable of
determining the fitness of individuals by assessing their success in reaching natural
resources, evading predators, and ultimately mating and reproducing. However, in
artificial evolution, determining the “fitness” of individuals is normally done using a
fitness function that measures the desired traits of the evolved individuals and quantifies
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them into numerical values. Having a representative fitness function is of great
importance to the GA success. In addition, it impacts the portability of the GA to other
problem domains. For instance, a fitness function to quantify the adherence of a frame to
certain edge-detection criteria will not fit a GA that aims to reduce noise in a
communication channel. Therefore, the OGA is equipped with a model-free, applicationindependent fitness function that relies on measuring the deviation between any evolved
individual and a known-to-be-good one. More details about the OGA‟s discrepancybased fitness function is presented in Section 4.2.3.3

3.3. Implement SMART and Evaluate it Using Widely Accepted Metrics
In this work, not only we develop and oversee an approach to promote self-repair with reduced
power consumption compared to traditional approaches, but we also synthesize the solution and
evaluate its performance in a realistic application running on intrinsic hardware configuration.

The ever-increasing complexities of computing systems require new original design paradigms.
Organic computing is one paradigm that restrains this complexity by allowing more freedom to
the system to improvise solutions at run time. The inherent authority of the system over its own
operation is usually manifested by the emergence of properties at the system level that can hardly
be noticed at the component level. These properties may be useful or harmful to the system's
operation. The design goal of any OC system is to subdue the emergence of harmful properties
while promoting helpful ones. The controlled emergence of life-like, self-x properties is what
distinguishes OCs from other design paradigms. Rather than manually providing all alternative
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execution paths at design time, the system is equipped with innate capability to actuate desired
configurations based on the sensory information that it acquires, making it capable of adapting to
handle many execution scenarios.

Whereas many OCs in literature were either conceptually prototyped or limitedly simulated,
SMART has been fully implemented and its benefits are demonstrated quantitatively in action
[88]. To place the system into a real-life context, we implemented real-time video edge detection
using a 2-D gradient-based Sobel edge detection algorithm. Table 5 shows the different modules
in the system along with the underlying technology that is used to implement them. The details
on each module are presented in Section 5.1.
Table 5: System Modules Implementation Details
Module
Organic layer
Video
capturing/buffering
HW-SW connection

Comm. Manager
Human Interface
Module (HIM)
Software monitor
Application
GA engine
OGA interface

Implementation Platform
ML402 mother board (lower board of Xilinx Video Starter Kit) with
Virtex-4 FPGA (XCV4SX35)
Video IO Daughter Card (VIODC)
(Upper board of Xilinx Video Starter Kit) with Virtex-2 PRO FPGA
XCV2P7
JTAG from FPGA side
Xilinx Parallel port host PC
GNAT to interface with the FEs
Multi-threaded C++ application
C++ encoder/decoder that accesses the file system
Java-based application (Figure 5)
Sobel edge detector (Verilog)
C++ based Standard GA [15]
C-based API (MRRA) [55]

Moreover, the experimental work has been expanded to evaluate SMART‟s advantages against
widely-accepted benchmarks. First, the availability of SMART and the industry standard TMR
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techniques were simulated through CTMC under the conditions of nine realistic space mission
use cases. All used numbers and parameters were acquired from either public resources or
experimental results of SMART operation. The simulation‟s merit was to abandon analytical and
steady-state reliability results in order to attain practical prediction of the nine use cases. The
results of these simulations are presented in Section 6.2.

Finally, whereas many works in the literature evaluated their systems against an assumed TMR
overhead of three times the FE overhead plus the voter overhead, we opted to employ special
tools to insert triplication in a design while maintaining efficient power, area, availability, and
timing standards. We used BL-TMR [18] tools to generate optimized triplicated FEs, in order to
gain more precise and unbiased comparison to SMART. The details of the evaluation methods
that were used are listed in Section 6.3.
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CHAPTER 4: A SMART ARCHITECTURE FOR MISSION-CRITICAL
SYSTEMS

Figure 3 depicts the detailed architecture of the lab prototype of SMART. In this prototype, the
software-based repair layer is implemented on a host PC to aid in experiments and validation.
The deployment system is intended to have the software components implemented in an
embedded PowerPC processor that comes with many commercially-available Xilinx FPGA
boards.

The lower half of the figure shows the organic hardware layer where one or more FPGA boards
can be accommodated in the system, each of which has one or more RARS module(s). The
RARS modules are connected via a dispatcher module, which facilitates the communication with
the software layer. This communication takes place through a JTAG interface on the FPGA side
to a parallel port on the host PC side via a Xilinx parallel cable. The software layer
communicates with the hardware through a multi-threaded communication manager, which is
responsible for abstracting all hardware complexities and providing messages to the various
software components. These components include the Human Interface Module (HIM), which
converts the binary message into human-readable text files, and vice versa. They also include the
repair modules, which are the scrubber and the OGA repair that will be thoroughly described in
upcoming sections.

45

Monitor

File System

Software

Scrubber
Config
Contoller

Inbox

Outbox

Organic
To
Human

Message
Decoder

Human
To
Organic

Java Applet
GUI (Monitor
and contol)

Communication Manager

Message
Encoder

Human Module Interface (HIM)

To Other Applications

Amorphous Spares
(AS)
OGA Repair

OGA Controller
Driver

Xilinx
IMPACT

From Other Applications

Multilayer Runtime
Reconfiguration
Architecture
(MRRA)

Chromosome
Manipulator

OGA
Engine

Parallel Port

Parallel
Cable

Status/Control

Hardware
JTAG

JTAG

Board-n

Board-1

Virtex-4 FPGA

Virtex-4
Virtex-4 FPGA
FPGA
RARS #1

Dispatcher
(GNAT)

FE-1

FE-2

FE-1
AE

Control

…

Status

RARS #1

RARS #n

FE-2

AE

Dispatcher
(GNAT)

FE-1

...

FE-2

AE

Control

…

Status

FE-3

FE-3

FE-3
Status

RARS #n
FE-1

AE

FE-3
Status

Control

FE-2

Control

Figure 3: SMART Top-level Hardware and Software Architecture

4.1. RARS Hardware Layer
The hardware layer consists of one or more RARSs and dispatchers configured on one or more
FPGA boards. The RARS module comprises the smallest integrated unit in the hardware
platform; it consists of one AE and three identical FEs. The AE is application-independent; it
contains the logic that drives the organic behavior by actively reorganizing the available FEs. On
the other hand, the FEs represents the application-dependent user implementation of the desired
functionality. Therefore, the FEs are the only modules that need to be modified for the system to
support new applications.
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Having three FEs in each RARS module illustrates the common practice of employing a TMR
configuration in redundancy-based fault-tolerant systems. Nonetheless, there is no loss of
generality which prevents RARS from accommodating

FEs for any

.

One straightforward approach is to initially enable two FEs while the third is kept offline as a
cold spare. Upon finding a discrepancy between the two outputs in the duplex mode, the AE
switches to the TMR mode of operation by placing the standby third FE online and activating a
voting scheme among the three FEs to obtain the correct output and hence masks single-fault.
While the duplex mode has the shortcoming of expending clock cycles from the instant it detects
a fault until the correct functional output is regained, it reduces the required dynamic power
compared to a conventional TMR in the no-fault scenario. Moreover, the fact that the standby FE
is normally offline makes its resources available for use for any other purpose.

4.1.1. Motivation as a Hybrid of Approaches
TMR requires three functionally-identical modules that perform the same task in tandem and a
voter that outputs the majority vote of the three modules [84]. Meanwhile, Concurrent Error
Detection (CED) [89] approaches rely on a duplex configuration and discrepancy detection
among the output bits of the redundant modules. Both TMR and CED can increase reliability
using Stand-by Sparing approaches whereby hot spares are kept in an idle state and thus are
ready to be called into action once required. Cold spares, in contrast, are kept shut down and thus
do not consume power, but incur delay before they are able to replace faulty modules.
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As described in SMART Design Objective 1: Exploit Reconfigurability to Realize Adaptive
Level of Redundancy, the tradeoff in all of these approaches is between increased system
reliability and increased resource consumption. Running in TMR means increased chances of
keeping the system healthy, but it also consumes approximately triple the area and the power.

Moreover, we hypothesize that fixing the redundancy level at design-time can be challenging as
the mission engineers do not have complete knowledge of the mission trajectory and the various
dynamic parameters than can impact it. Some missions can go smoothly for 99.99% of the time,
only requiring high degree of redundancy in the remaining 0.01% due to a probabilistic event
that may or may not have occurred in other similar missions. Such uncertainty complicates
design-time decisions, and in mission-critical applications that are highly valued due to their
scientific and social impact, the wise decision can be often to increase redundancy to be prepared
for any events, even the unlikely ones. Thus, RARS promotes run-time adaptive redundancy
techniques, taking advantage of the inherit reconfigurability property of the underlying FPGA
devices. The initiative of growing and shrinking the number of spares on demand is the focal
contribution of RARS.

In addition, the fault recovery decision is not a black-and-white one, if the FPGA board is hit by
a strong radiation or thermal flux such that two functional modules of a particular TMR are
partially damaged. Assuming the third one is in a better state, it might be more useful to shut
down the two fault modules and operate on simplex configuration, saving energy and electrical
stress during a critical stage of the mission, and eliminating the possibility of the other two,
faulty, modules to overrule the healthy one when they both agree on an erroneous output. A
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simple operational mode might serve the mission purpose better than a TMR, something that
cannot be entirely predicted during design time, but can only be wished for when certain
conditions are met during the mission runtime.

For that reason, we wanted the organic hardware layer of SMART to be as flexible and dynamic
as possible; the more flexible RARS is, the more options SMART will have during mission runtime. RARS is a generic fault-tolerant module that can operate in Simplex, Duplex, and TMR
configurations; there are three Functional Elements (FEs) and one Autonomic Element (AE), the
AE is a controller for the fault tolerant behavior that is completely independent from the FEs,
which are solely in charge of accomplishing the functional requirements of the mission.

4.1.2. Architecture and Components
The proposed RARS architecture is shown in Figure 4. The functional input is delivered directly
to the three FEs for evaluation. The outputs of the FEs are then sent to the AE to be processed by
the following five modules:

1. Discrepancy Sensor (DS): This component uses the three FE outputs to detect
discrepancies between any pair of enabled FEs. This module is only activated when
RARS is running in the duplex mode; otherwise, it is disabled to conserve energy.

2. Voter. The voter module performs bitwise voting among the three FE outputs and
produces the majority vote. It also generates a report that conveys any of the condition
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codes listed in Table 6. The voter is enabled only in the TMR mode and otherwise is
disabled to save power and resources.
Table 6: Possible Values of the Voter Report
Voter report
000
001
010
100
111
101

Description
No discrepancy among the three FEs
FE1 is discrepant from the other two FEs
FE2 is discrepant from the other two FEs
FE3 is discrepant from the other two FEs
All FEs are discrepant (m-bit, m>1)
Voter is disabled

3. Output Actuator (OA): This module performs a 4x1 multiplexer function. The inputs
come from the outputs of FE1, FE2, FE3, and the voter. The selection lines come from
the Redundancy Controller (will be described shortly), while the output drives the overall
system‟s functional output. This module signifies the flexibility of the AE compared to
other fixed redundancy techniques, because RARS can select from all of the simplex
configurations in addition to the majority vote output.

4. Performance Monitor (PM): This module samples the DS and the voter report to provide
reports that reflect the aggregate performance of the system. The PM is periodically
polled by the software layer during repairs to acquire system performance to convey the
fitness value of the evaluated individuals.

5. Redundancy Controller (RC). This is the core element in the AE; it is responsible for the
unit awareness and for sending status reports and receiving control signals to or from the
software layer. In SMART, the RC is a Finite State Machine (FSM) that encodes all
possible system configurations. The inputs to this state machine are the reports from the
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various modules, such as the DS, voter, and the PM. The output drives the “Enable”
signals for all the modules and the selection lines for the OA. Moreover, this module
contains the communication logic of the dispatcher and the input and output buffers that
store the incoming and outgoing messages.

Reconfigurable Adaptive Redundancy System (RARS)
Enable FE-3
Enable FE-2
Enable FE-1
Autonomic Element (AE)
Output 1

Enable

To/From
Dispatcher

Discrepancy
Report

Redundancy
Controller
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Functional
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Functional
Element (FE-2)
Voter

Functional
Input
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Performance

Performance
Monitor
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Output

Voting
Result
Select

Functional
Element (FE-3)

Output
Actuator

Figure 4: Reconfigurable Adaptive Redundancy System (RARS)

4.1.3. Range of Possible Configurations
To obtain adaptive levels of redundancy, RARS uses real-time performance feedback based on
the mission objectives to dynamically reorganize its modules into one of the following
configurations.
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1. Simplex. The RC disables two FEs, the DS, and the voter. The OA propagates the
enabled FE output. This configuration allows highest energy conservation if that is a
priority. It is also practical during non-critical stages of missions. The simplex
configuration can also be enabled during repair in a pair-and-spare scheme.

2. Duplex. The DS is enabled to inform the RC in the event of output disagreement between
the two enabled FEs. The OA is set to one of the enabled FEs. This configuration is only
used for applications that can tolerate temporary degradation in output quality until the
RC takes further repair action. The system can run in duplex mode while repairing a
faulty module in order to detect additional faults in the online modules.

3. TMR: The voter and all FEs are enabled, whereas the OA propagates the voter output.
Only the DS can be disabled as the voter report is able to convey all needed information.
The system can maintain 100% correct throughput in the TMR mode even if one module
is faulty. Even with the existence of multiple faults, design diversity and compensating
module faults [13] can still assist in generating a correct vote. The TMR configuration is
utilized in this platform when the system is repairing a faulty FE because it can maintain
a fully functional system while the FE is repaired. This is made possible by dynamic PR,
which keeps the system online while performing repair.

4. Hybrid Mode. Many temporal configurations can be supported by RARS. For instance,
an application can run in simplex mode but switch to duplex periodically to detect
discrepancies. Another usage example might be an application that has a duplex
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reliability requirement except during certain stages of the mission, where it can switch to
TMR in order to meet reliability needs. Downgrading is also possible based on reliability
needs, while the arrangement of FEs can be dynamically reconfigured back to the original
configuration once the operating behavior has changed accordingly.

A key consideration in RARS is that reconfiguration adds minimal additional component to
functional critical path. The design attempts to promote the fact that if faults occur outside the
FEs logic, only the recovery is impacted, not the FEs functionality. Therefore, we can apply the
RARS concept recursively if needed to provide coverage for faults in the AE. Nonetheless,
reconfiguration capability needs to remain intact for recovery by reconfiguration to remain
viable, and also the voter logic should remain intact, as in conventional TMR approach, to
guarantee that the correct vote is propagated as the functional output.

Assuming that the AE voting core is an unbreakable voting element will indeed add a singlefailure point to the fault-tolerant system. However, this risk is alleviated by the fact that the voter
element of the AE has much lower area than the FEs, meaning that the probability of fault hitting
the voter element is reduced accordingly. The FEs in the experimental use case of the edge
detector have a total size of approximately 1800 LUTs, compared to the voter element of
approximately 100 LUTs. This means that the probability that a fault happens in the voter is 5%
of the probability of a fault to hit the FEs logic. This value is still high enough to be neglected in
mission critical applications, a successful approach to handle golden elements is random pairings
and temporal voting that have been successfully demonstrated in [90]. Moreover, The FEs are
expected to considerably increase in area for real complex applications, the voter is not expected
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to scale with the same degree, further reducing the chance of broken golden element compared to
the functional elements.

4.2. Organic Fault-Tolerance Software Management Layer
The software layer controls the higher-level throughput of the system by monitoring the
performance and enabling active repair when the performance dips below an acceptable level as
specified by the mission requirements. The software layer serves two main purposes:

The first purpose is to provide an interface to monitor and control the hardware. To that end, a
Java applet GUI has been created to depict the hardware status schematically and show the status
of each component. The applet is shown in Figure 5, it shows the following information:

1. FE Status: online, offline, faulty, fault-free, or under repair.

2. AE Configuration: simplex, duplex, or TMR.

3. Performance level: the number of reported discrepancies divided by the total number of
evaluations.

4. Log of the transmitted messages: The communicated messages are recorded as a papertrail of hardware status changes.
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Figure 5: Java Applet GUI Indicating Instantaneous RARS Status

The second purpose of the software layer is to enable higher-level autonomous recovery
techniques. First, the scrubbing technique rewrites the CBS to the FPGA in order to fix any SEU
in the configuration logic. Second, the AS are consecutively reconfigured on the FPGA until the
faulty element is excluded from the logic path, as a way to quickly evade resources hit with hardfaults when a proper spars is available. Last, we have demonstrated in our experimental work
that we are able to recover simulated hard-fault by means of OGA. The fitness function was set
to be the instantaneous performance level of RARS over a recent window of inputs.
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4.2.1. Architecture and Components
The top half of Figure 3 shows the architecture of the software layer. The Communication
Manager (CM) is a multi-threaded C++ module that acts as the parallel port driver to
communicated messages with the hardware. HIM converts the binary messages in the CM
queues into human-readable messages that are stored in a predefined directory on the file system,
and vice versa. The Message Decoder consults the communication protocol opcode table and
generates text files representation of the messages. For example, this decoded message illustrates
the status of FE #2 in RARS #1 as being online and fault-free:
MSG_NAME: FE_STATUS_REPORT
MSG_CODE: 3
AE_ID: 1
FE_ID: 2
STATUS: 1 (ONLINE AND FAULT-FREE)
Any application that complies with the protocol message format can communicate with the
hardware layer. The encoder periodically polls for message files stored in a predefined directory,
encodes them into binary representation, and stores them in the inbox queue of the CM in order
to be sent to the organic hardware. This platform provides a bi-directional communication link
between the organic hardware and any user application that needs to monitor and/or control it. A
Graphical User Interface (GUI) was constructed to display hardware status. The GUI is
dynamically updated based on the customizable message exchange frequency.

The scrubber and the GA repair modules can be seen to the right of the CM in Figure 3. These
modules are described in detail in the next two sections. Both of them can reconfigure the FPGA
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by executing batch files that invoke the Xilinx iMPACT tool [20] to perform partial device
reconfiguration using the parallel Cable IV.

4.2.2. Scrubbing and Amorphous Spares
The RARS-centric techniques are sufficient to recover from transient faults in the user logic.
SEUs in the configuration logic and hard faults cannot be indefinitely masked by redundancy
because any further faults can shift the voting results toward the faulty FEs. Thus, in such cases,
RARS will signal to the software layer of SMART to intervene and help fixing this type of
persistent faults.

SMART begins by assuming that the persistent fault is caused by an SEU in the configuration
logic (soft fault) that caused the flipping of one or more LUT bit(s). SMART handles this via
scrubbing the bitfile to correct the impact of the SEU and thus restore the correct funct ional
operation of the circuit. Scrubbing entails fetching the CBS from an off-chip ROM via PowerPC
APIs, reconfiguring the faulty FE via the ICAP, reading back the freshly downloaded bitfile to
compare it to the ROM-based golden image, and finally monitoring the discrepancy for a
sufficient number of evaluations to ensure that the fault is indeed corrected by scrubbing.

If the fault is not corrected by simple CBS scrubbing, SMART concludes that it is caused by a
hard fault that requires extra repair effort. It starts by repetitively configuring a set of design-time
generated spares that have different area constraints to guarantee the avoidance of each and every
LUT in at least one of the spares. This will ensure that each faulty LUT can be avoided by, at
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least, one available spare. These spares are called amorphous because they have the same
hardware design which can be constrained by the Xilinx tools to avoid certain LUTs, meaning
that the spare generation effort is minimal.

The AS generation is accomplished via the Xilinx PROHIBIT constraint in the Xilinx User
Constraint File (UCF) [20]. The PROHIBIT constraint allows the designer to specify a set of
LUTs that should be avoided during the placement stage of the bitfile creation process. For
example, the following constraint will exclude all slices in the range between locations (0, 33)
and (13, 33):

CONFIG PROHIBIT= SLICE_X0Y33:SLICE_X13Y33

The same HDL entry is used to generate multiple configuration bitfiles, each with different UCF
settings that exclusively prohibit the use of a set of slices. When a fault occurs, the scrubber
successively downloads the bitfiles to the FPGA and searches for a configuration that prohibits
the use the faulty LUT, in which case the fault will be corrected throughout a window of
evaluations. If none of the AS was able to hide the erroneous output, perhaps because there is
more than one faulty LUT in the FE that cannot be excluded by any spare, the scrubber ceases to
be efficient and will consequently request the intervention of the OGA repair.

The scrubber is the first line of recovery from faults that cannot be handled by RARS
reorganization techniques. SMART relies on lazy scrubbing [17] such that only the discrepant
FE in a TMR configuration is partially reconfigured while the system remains online; the other
two fault-free FEs, along with the voter, guarantee that the system can maintain correct overall
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output while the faulty FE is being scrubbed. A tile-based reconfiguration approach for faulttolerance is covered in details in [43].

4.2.3. Organic GA Repair Technique
SMART‟s autonomous fault-tolerance method installs OGA as an integral part of the repair
cycle because it offers hard-faults active repair that is independent of the number of carried
spares. However, the GA is a nondeterministic process than can affect the flexibility of SMART
if not designed efficiently. Thus, three properties that can enhance the efficiency of the GA for
an organic system were addressed.

4.2.3.1.Direct Bitstream Evolution
Genetic representation is the process of mapping from the visible traits of the application (i.e.,
phenotypes) to the genetic coding of the chromosomes (i.e., genotypes), and vice versa. The
Phenotype to Genotype Mapping (PTGM) is performed only once during the design stage of the
GA, and it requires special care to capture the building blocks that the GA needs to evolve in
order to achieve the desired solutions [91]. The Genotype to Phenotype Mapping (GTPM), on the
other hand, is applied every time the individual fitness is evaluated to transform chromosomes
into physical individuals that can be evaluated by the GA.

This two-way mapping can be a source of errors and complications if the distance between the
genetic encoding and the phenotypic realization is large. For instance, if the GA evolves the
HDL code of the FE to repair its circuit realization on the FPGA, then every time the
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chromosome is evaluated, it must undergo synthesis, mapping, Placement and Routing (PAR),
bitfile generation, and FPGA reconfiguration, which is a huge overhead to endure for every
evaluation. For that reason, we designed OGA to use direct bitstream evolution, whereby the
chromosome is selected to be the FPGA raw bitfile. This selection puts the burden of PTGM on
the FPGA vendors (Xilinx in this work) and abridges GTP to a mere Xilinx iMPACT run to
download the CBS onto the FPGA.

Direct evolution of a bitstream depends upon details about the LUT mapping between the CBS
and the actual device. It is required to manipulate the encoding of the bitfile to be able to apply
genetic operators like crossover and mutation to the relevant sections of the long bit array. This
overhead is still considered feasible given the vast advantages of direct CBS evolution in term of
increased performance and reduced mapping effort. In order to directly manipulate the CBS, it is
necessary to decode its bits to understand how to locate and modify specific LUTs and thus
change the behavior of the resulting circuit. To that end, we extended the Virtex-2 approach that
we previously developed in [15] to perform direct bitstream evolution on Virtex-4 devices.

The CBS contains the LUT content that is evolved by the OGA in addition to other information
like routing, checksums, and header information such as the device signature and the time of
bitfile creation. We implemented an LUT mapping module, as shown in Figure 6, to map the
location of LUT_X_Y, where X and Y are valid coordinates inside the evolved FE, to the correct
offset in the CBS file. This mapping is not entirely documented in any of Xilinx application
notes; rather, it was discovered through repetitive trial-and-error experiments.
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X1 Y2

X2 Y2 X3 Y2

X1 Y1

X2 Y1 X3 Y1

Evolved FE

Figure 6: Mapping from LUT Coordinates to CBS Offset Representation
Each experiment aimed to discover the mapping between one of the LUT coordinates and the
corresponding bit offset in the CBS file. This was accomplished by viewing the Native Circuit
Description (NCD) file using the visual Xilinx FPGA editor tool [20] and negating the content of
one known LUT. The NCD files before and after the negations were used to generate bitfiles
with the same bit generation (bitgen) options [20]. The two resulting CBSs were then compared
using a hex comparator. The 16-bit LUT content could be readily identified by monitoring the
inverted bits between the two hex files, other differences resulting from header and time stamps
were usually located at the beginning of the bitfiles and thus promptly discarded. After many
trials, one can infer a relation between the XY of the LUTs and their offsets in the file, or rather
store a lookup table that contains all of the used LUTs along with their corresponding offset in
the CBS file, to assist in the mapping.
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4.2.3.2.Intrinsic Fitness Evaluation
There are two methods to measure the fitness of the evolved individual. The common approach
is extrinsic evaluation [14] , which operates on a software model of the FPGA device. This
abstraction simplifies the experiments and can be tuned more dynamically. However, the
resulting representation has to undergo mapping and PAR on the target FPGA at deployment
time. This step imposes risk of incompatibility between the device's physical constraints and the
software model that was used in simulation, thereby possibly leading to incorrect solutions.
Instead, the OGA performs intrinsic fitness evaluation [14], whereby the hardware itself is used
to measure the fitness of the evolved individuals. All of the device‟s physical constraints are
considered during the process, and even the output is measured from the FPGA device while
processing the functional inputs of the application.

Therefore, the system can remain online during fitness evaluation, provided that there are
redundant parts to compensate for the evolved individual. Intrinsic evaluation requires that the
evolved circuit is configured into the FPGA device each time the fitness is measured. This
process is made feasible because of the direct bitstream feature of OGA, which means that the
GTPM requires only a Xilinx iMPACT device configuration to place the circuit on the FPGA.

4.2.3.3.Model-Free Fitness Function
An accurate fitness function is a critical factor in designing an efficient GA because it
determines the shape of the problem landscape that the GA will search [91]. This process can be
extremely complicated in real-life engineering problems because it requires capturing all the
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attributes that distinguish a good solution from other ones. In addition, it is highly dependent on
the problem domain, because what is good for one particular purpose does not usually fit other
purposes.

Because SMART is intended to be a generic platform that fits any application domain, the OGA
employs a novel, application-independent, model-free fitness function that can be ported to other
applications with minimal effort. This was made possible because of the robust design of RARS,
which enables run-time discrepancy detection between the evolved FE and other redundant,
fault-free one(s). The model-free fitness function quantifies the fitness of the evaluated FE by
counting the number of discrepancies between its output and other fault-free FE‟s. The number
of discrepancies over a window of evaluations is stored in the PM, and is reported back by the
RC to the OGA engine using a performance report message. This value quantifies the deviation
between the evaluated individual‟s fitness and the ideal one, where low values indicate fitter
individuals. Therefore, the GA becomes a minimization optimizer for this value.

It is important to note that this model-free fitness functions is only possible when the goal is to
repair a faulty circuit when there is another redundant circuit on the FPGA that can produce the
same functionality. This condition does not pose any limitation on redundancy-based faulttolerant systems because the redundant parts are activated anyway in order to maintain correct
functional output. The OGA takes advantage of that and implements the model-free fitness
function. Future work might consider adding a customizable layer of application-dependent
fitness evaluation knowledge to aid in even faster convergence.
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4.2.3.4.OGA Design and Implementation
The OGA platform consists of the following modules [15]:

1. GA Engine: This is a C++ application that implements a customizable, Standard Genetic
Algorithm

(SGA). This

module

is platform-independent;

it

encapsulates the

implementation of the SGA, including the population data structures, the functionality for
selection and replacement, and other standard GA operators such as mutation and
crossover.

2. Chromosome Manipulator: This is a C-based library that abstracts the underlying
hardware from the perspective of the OGA engine. It provides hardware-independent
abstraction of the genetic operators so that they can be executed with regard to the LUT
boundaries in the long CBS string.

3. MRRA: This is a set of APIs that facilitates communication with the target FPGA device
[55]. This module handles direct bitstream manipulation and decoding and includes the
LUT mapping module that is depicted in Figure 6.

4. Bitstream File: PR bitstream file that represents the FE design. It is generated beforehand
using the Xilinx tools. The format and content of this file are identified through repetitive
trial-and-error experiments to map the contents and location of the bits to the physical
LUT locations in the FE.
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Figure 7 shows the complete OGA platform. The OGA engine relies on the chromosome
manipulator to perform platform-independent mutation and crossover operations. It also reads
the fitness values from the CM, which in turn acquires them directly from the hardware via the
communication protocol messages. The MRRA module operates directly on the bitstream using
the LUT mapping module shown in Figure 6, and then invokes a batch file that runs the
iMPACT tool, which performs boundary-scan device-chain initialization and then programs the
chip. All communication proceeds via the parallel port from the host PC side to the JTAG port
from the FPGA side.
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Figure 7: OGA Intrinsic Evolution Platform
The OGA creates the initial population based on the PR bitfile that was used to configure the
original faulty FE. It generates a copy of the bitfile for each individual in the initial population,
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and then randomizes its LUT bits to promote genetic diversity that should lead to more
innovative solutions.

After that, each individual‟s fitness is evaluated intrinsically by downloading its bitfile to the
FPGA using iMPACT. The OGA engine then requests the fitness value of the evaluated
individual using a PERFORMANCE_REQUEST message that is sent to RARS through the
JTAG-GNAT interface. The RC reads the PM counters, which are updated periodically based on
the

actual

run-time

functional

inputs

that

the

FEs

process,

it

then

formulates

PERFORMANCE_REPORT as a reply message and sends it back to the GA engine.

After evaluating the fitness of all individuals, the OGA selects the individuals that will
participate in the creation of the next generation using tournament selection of size 2 (value was
set based on preliminary runs aimed to locate the most promising GA parameters for the
experimental work). The selected individuals are then mated to create the offspring using singlepoint crossover and conventional bit-flip mutation operation. Both operators are executed on the
raw bitfile as mandated by the direct bitstream evolution premise. The mapping between the
LUT coordinates and its actual location in the bitfile is abstracted using the LUT mapping
module that was demonstrated in Figure 6 to map FE XY coordinates to the actual offset of the
evolved LUTs location in the bitfile.

Finally, the newly created offspring is assigned to the population of the next generation and the
OGA repeats the same steps over and over until an adequate solution is found, which in our
experiments was defined as realizing no discrepancies at all between the evolved individual and
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the fault-free ones over a predefined window of readings. This termination criterion can be
relaxed for more complex applications or ones that require faster repair time at the expense of the
fitness of the final solution.

4.3. Fault-Handling Handshaking-Based Communication Protocol
The communication protocol consists of two components. The first is the hardware component
that resides on the FPGA board and includes the standard JTAG interface serial port and the
GNAT platform [15] , which is configured on the device to support input and output operations
with the AE. The second component is the software, which runs on a host PC that is connected to
the FPGA. The AE sends messages to the Dispatcher, which is then polled by the CM from the
software layer via the JTAG interface. On the other way around, binary-encoded messages are
shifted from the CM to the Dispatcher via JTAG and then routed to the destination AE or
broadcasted to all AEs. The messages are 16 bits in width, with a Xilinx Parallel Cable IV
download rate of 5 Mbps [92], the communication link can theoretically handle up to 300,000
messages per second.

The JTAG boundary scan interface (IEEE 1149.1) is implemented on the non-reconfigurable
area of the Xilinx Virtex devices. The interface offers half-duplex serial communication between
the user circuit on the FPGA and the host PC. The GNAT component is implemented on the
reconfigurable area of the chip to connect the JTAG boundary scan with the user circuit to
provide bi-directional communication channel. The communication protocol relies on
handshaking to acknowledge received messages and request new ones. The protocol also
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specifies a 16-bit packet format with 5 bits reserved for the opcode, thus supporting up to 32
message types, while the remaining fields are used for AE and FE addressing, and other purposes
like performance readings and component status. The messages defined in the protocol along
with their field specifications are listed in the Appendix: Communication Protocol Messages.

The class diagram of the software communication layer is shown in Figure 8. Special care was
taken to design the CM to enhance availability and graceful degradation. These objectives were
mandated by the fact that the system is designed for mission-critical applications. Hence, multithreading and non-blocking calls were extensively employed in the design to support these nonfunctional requirements. Multi-threading was adopted such that every active communication is
held over its own thread. This design prevents blocking the controller class, thereby making it
available to serve any other incoming calls. For example, if the connection object informs the
communication controller object that there is a new message that requires processing, the
communication controller opens a separate thread to handle the message, leaving the main object
free to engage in any other operation.

The AE allocates inbox and outbox queues to respectively store incoming and outgoing message;
in addition, it continues to poll the head of the inbox queue periodically to search for new
messages. Once the AE finds one, it decodes the opcode field to extract the message type and
then forms a response message to serve the request, placing it at the end of the outbox queue to
be processed later by the software layer.
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The communication protocol relies on handshaking to acknowledge received messages and
request new ones. Examples of the messages that flow from the software to the hardware are as
follows.

1- FE_STATUS_REQUEST solicits the status of a particular FE (RARS_Index.FE_Index).

2- AE_STATUS_REQUEST solicits the status of a particular AE (RARS_ Index.AE_
Index).

3- PERFORMANCE_REQUEST asks a particular RARS to report back the values of the
Performance Counter (PC).

The respective responses of the hardware to these messages are as follows.

1- FE_STATUS_REPORT reports FE status (such as online healthy, online faulty, offline,
and so on).

2- AE_STATUS_REPORT reports AE status (such as Simplex, Duplex, Voter, and so on).

3- PERFORMANCE_REPORT reports the PC value.
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Figure 8: Class Diagram of the Communication Module in the Software Layer

4.4. Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration
SMART relies on the repetitive reconfiguration of the FPGA to achieve active repair via
scrubbing and intrinsic evolution. Dynamic PR was successfully introduced into the RARS
hardware in order to reduce repair time. Introducing dynamic PR into this design, the faulty FEs
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could be reconfigured in 1.8% of the time originally required to reconfigure the entire system.
This improvement becomes extremely important during the repair process, considering that the
OGA may require thousands of evaluations to evolve an adequate solution. This approach also
has the added advantage of keeping the system online during bitstream downloading.

Early Access Partial Reconfiguration (EAPR) design flow [93] was used to achieve dynamic PR
capabilities. This flow requires a strict design routine that does not follow the conventional
single-pass of synthesis, mapping, and PAR. Instead, it requires the design to have an explicit
modular structure such that the PR modules are singled out at the top-level module. These
modules are called Partial Reconfigurable Modules (PRM), whereas the region of the fabric to
be reconfigured is defined as a Partial Reconfigurable Region (PRR). PRMs define the
functionality of each PRR. All other logic in the design is referred to as static logic. All resources
required for an FE must be confined within a PRR.

To connect each FE with the surrounding logic, a special interface is required, known as a Bus
Macro (BM). BMs are special structures that are implemented with the help of CLB in which
pre-configured LUTs are used to transfer signals between the static logic and the reconfigurable
region. A group of LUTs in one CLB is placed on the PRR side, and another group of LUTs in
another CLB is placed on the static side. This two-CLB macro can provide a communication
bandwidth of up to 8 bits. BMs are made available by Xilinx to compensate for the old
alternative of using hard-wired tri-state buffers, which have been used with earlier PR design
flows and are known to present strict constraints on the communication bandwidth due to the
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limited number of buffers available on the fabric. The BMs are uni-directional structures and can
be placed on all sides of a PRR.

The other factor to consider in the PR process is the configuration frame size of the target device.
For Xilinx Virtex 4 FPGAs, a frame is 16 CLBs long and one CLB wide. The time to reconfigure
a functional element depends on the bitstream size, which is proportional to the number of
frames. The resource allocated to each FE is the same because the three elements are functionally
and physically identical. The total number of configurable logic blocks allocated to each FE is
112. Each FE requires seven logic configuration frames to be loaded for its partial
reconfiguration.

The introduction of partial reconfiguration reduced the size of the bitstream considerably and
thus improved the reconfiguration time for the FEs. The full bitstream size is 1.7 MB, and it
takes 2.61 seconds to fully download using the Parallel Cable IV. However, the partial bitstream
is 31 KB and requires only 48 milliseconds to configure. This improvement becomes extremely
important during the repair process, considering that the GA may require thousands of
evaluations to evolve an adequate solution. In addition, the PRR can be reconfigured while the
system is running. Therefore, considering that the system will be running in the TMR mode,
under the assumption of a single-fault scenario, the system can still maintain 100% performance
while undergoing repairs.

Figure 9 shows a snapshot of each of the three PRRs along with the static, top-level full design
of the RARS. The placement of the PRR and the BMs was achieved with the help of the Xilinx
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PlanAhead tool [93] . All of the clock signals BUFGs, I/O signals, BMs, and DCMs were
defined in the top-level module. A user constraint file was assigned to the top-level module that
contained all of the I/O pin constraints, the range of all of the PRRs using the AREA_GROUP
constraint, and the location of all of the bus macros.

Figure 9: FPGA Layout for FE1, FE2, FE3, and RARS

4.5. The Repair Cycle and Self-x Properties
The controlled emergence of self-x properties is what distinguishes OCs from other design
paradigms [48]. Rather than providing all alternative execution paths at design time, the system
is equipped with innate capability to actuate different configurations based on run-time sensory
information, making it adaptive to various execution scenarios.

Figure 10 shows the repair cycle that the system executes in order to maintain the highest
possible correct throughput. The flow diagram is partitioned into three black-framed boxes to
signify the observed organic self-x properties that emerge upon executing each repair stage.
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The left side of the diagram shows the organic repair that is implemented on the FPGA device.
The prominent observed self-x properties are self-monitoring and self-organization. The selfmonitoring property is manifested by the system‟s self-awareness of any discrepancy that results
from one or more faulty FE(s) through the use of different sensors, enhanced with self-diagnosis
of the exact faulty FE through monitoring the discrepancies of the output lines. The first repair
action the system takes upon detecting faults is reorganizing the components of the system to
mask the fault. The self-organization property emerges through adjusting the redundancy
configuration in order to hide the effect of hardware failures. The example in Figure 10 shows a
Duplex-TMR-Duplex reorganization scenario, but other reorganization sequences can be applied
to meet the desired reliability levels as mandated by the mission requirements.

When the degree of the faults exceeds the inherent redundancy capacity of RARS, SMART
triggers a different repair cycle that demonstrates another organic activity, namely, selfconfiguration. The self-configuration property emerges through successive lazy-scrubbing [17]
attempts, which begins by rewriting the same CBS to eliminate SEUs in the configuration logic.
Then, if the fault is caused by a stuck-at hard-fault, scrubbing proceeds to reconfiguring the
FPGA with a set of pre-seeded amorphous spares that have different area constraints to
potentially introduce an FE that does not utilize the faulty LUT.

Finally, if self-configuration fails to bypass the faulty element(s), the system initiates a more
elaborate refurbishment cycle that relies on OGA. This evolutionary repair introduces selfhealing property at the system-level, which is characterized by the system‟s ability to actively
recover from more catastrophic fault scenarios by searching for innovative solutions using
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evolutionary approaches. Self-healing is not limited by the degree of redundancy nor the number
of amorphous spares, which makes it a compelling option for complex fault scenarios. However,
SMART makes OGA the last resort in the repair sequence due to its long repair time.
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Figure 10: System Self-x Properties Flow Diagram
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Fitness Reading

In SMART, failures in the reconfiguration logic will only cause the loss of the software-based
fault-tolerance features, that is, scrubbing and OGA. However, the inherent organic hardware of
RARS will remain intact to switch among the available Simplex, Duplex and Triplex
configurations. This graceful degradation property means that the system will become, at worst,
a TMR system if the parallel/serial interface fails.

Complete handling of failures in reconfiguration logic in FPGA devices is beyond the scope of
this work, we relied on proven solutions provided by Xilinx, the main manufacturer of FPGA
chips, to deal with this type of faults [94]. Moreover, the same techniques used in handling faults
in the data path can be extended to the reconfiguration logic. One prominent approach in dealing
with this kind of faults using redundancy can be found in [95].

Virtex-4 FPGAs are fully characterized for Single-Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI), which are
SEEs that result in device-wide operation interrupts such as power on reset, configuration
circuitry, frame address register used extensively in the reconfiguration process, and some other
global signals that affect reconfiguration logic and device functionality. Xilinx states that pulsing
the PROG signal will result in correcting any of the aforementioned SEFIs [94].

More catastrophic faults, such as hard faults affecting the ICAP, can be recovered using
redundancy techniques presented in [95]. This technique protects the ICAP logic in a similar
fashion to any other user application logic. First, by having TMR inserted in the ICAP circuit
using BL-TMR tools to correct faulty configuration on the fly. Second, by scrubbing the ICAP
interface in case an SEU is suspected in the configuration logic. These techniques can be used to
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prevent the parallel/serial configuration interfaces from becoming a single point of failure in
SMART.
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

Using the Xilinx Video Starter Kit (VSK) FPGA board shown in Figure 11 [96] and the other
technologies listed in Table 4, the benefits of SMART are demonstrated quantitatively using a
2D gradient-base Sobel edge detection algorithm.

Figure 11: Xilinx Dual-Layered Video Starter Kit

5.1. Experimental Configuration: Edge Detection Application
In this work, we implement a popular edge detection algorithm to demonstrate the capabilities of
SMART. There are various applications for edge detection, as it involves identifying boundaries
in an image. Thus, it can be employed for object recognition and quality monitoring in industrial
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applications, medical imaging applications, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and
ultrasound imaging [56], and satellite imaging applications [57]. Numerous efforts have been
made to design edge detectors using evolutionary techniques [56, 63]; we compare our GA
performance against those techniques in Table 11.

Figure 12 shows SMART application architecture where a continuous video stream provides the
functional input to the circuit. The video is transmitted via either the Video Graphic Array (VGA)
or the Digital Video Interface (DVI) output ports on the host PC to the VGA-In or DVI-In,
respectively, on the upper board of the Xilinx VSK, the Video IO Daughter Card (VIODC) [96].
In this system, we used the VGA ports on both ends, but nothing prevents the system from
running on a DVI interface because of the versatility of the AD9887A dual interface on the
VOIDC. Indeed, this IC offers both an analog and a digital receiver integrated on a single chip.
The AD9887 has a parallel digital bus interface with the FPGA for video data and an I2C control
bus for configuration. The captured frames are buffered into the Block RAM (BRAM) of the
Virtex-II Pro XCV2P7 FPGA on VIODC. The frames are continuously written on the BRAMs;
if the video feed stops then the last captured frame is used for all pixel operations until the feed is
resumed.
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Figure 12: SMART Use Case System Architecture
A sequencer module handles memory scanning and synchronization and sends the pixel data
through the Xilinx Generic Interface (XGI) connector [96]. This connector is a 64-bit bus which
connects between the lower board, referred to as the ML402 motherboard, and the upper VIODC
board. It uses a simple synchronous interface running at 100 MHz to send data and control
information between the two boards.

A goal achieved in the prototype is application-independence. That is, any other application can
be implemented by designing new logic in the FEs and by tuning the clock-division ratio in the
DCM to match the frequencies of the AE and the FEs.
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Applications that are known to be more tolerant to errors than other kinds of design, such as
Signal processing applications, will tend to ameliorate the impact of erroneous behavior.
However, the metric reported in our results is actual data path bitwise discrepancies of the
output. The fitness function did not rely on any kind of pixel averaging or gradient-based
operators to quantify image quality into fitness values. This discrepancy-based metric on a pixelby-pixel basis makes this approach applicable for non digital signal processing applications with
no loss of generality.

On the ML402 motherboard, the enabled FEs in RARS process the video feed and provide the
output to the AE. Based on the current configuration of the system, the AE produces the overall
output and stores it into the XCV4SX35 BRAMs. In fact, it stores both the original and the edgedetected video stream for demonstration purposes. The BRAMs are continuously scanned by a
VGA driver that is implemented on the same FPGA to generate the VSCAN, HSCAN, and RGB
values for the VGA-Out interface. The VGA-out is connected to another monitor that shows both
the original and edge–detected video streams. Any error in the edge detection can be clearly
spotted on this monitor, as shown in Figure 14.

The three FEs and the AE are connected to the host PC that runs the organic software layer. This
PC is tied to a monitor that displays the real-time status of the organic layer using the GUI Java
applet. The status and control signals are passed between the FEs/AE on one side and the
BSCAN/JTAG on the other side. The organic layer and the FEs (i.e., the Sobel edge detector)
were implemented using Verilog HDL and synthesized into FPGA bitfiles using the Xilinx ISE
9.1 software packs [20]
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The DIP switches beneath the LCD screen on the ML402 FPGA board were used to simulate
stuck-at faults in the data path to test the ability of RARS to switch configurations in order to
mask faults immediately. One of the switches was also used to enable or disable the organic
repair capabilities (i.e., AE Enable), as shown in Table 7. Nine LEDs were used to show the
status of various modules of the design. Three of them reflect the status of the voter report shown
in Table 6, whereas the other six show the status of the FEs, with two LEDs per FE, as shown in
Table 8.
Table 7: DIP Switch Assignment in RARS Prototype
DIP-Switch
1
2
3
4

Purpose
AE Enable to control organic capabilities
Stuck-at fault injected in FE1
Stuck-at fault injected in FE2
Stuck-at fault injected in FE3

Table 8: LED Assignment in RARS Prototype
LED 1
OFF
OFF
ON
ON

LED 2
OFF
ON
OFF
ON

FE status
Offline and faulty
Offline
Online and faulty
Online

It is imperative to mention that the fault simulation accomplished via the dip switches is only for
the SEUs or stuck-at faults in the data path. This was done by masking the enabled dip switch
logical value with one bit of the pixels input of the edge detector to affect the data signals. This
kind of error should be repaired instantly by the hardware through the embedded configurations
of RARS. However, in order to simulate the stuck-at faults in the configuration logic, we had to
actually alter the value of one or more of the LUT contents. We accomplished this by using the
FPGA editor to manually alter the content of one LUT in the NCD file in schematic view. Both
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types of fault simulation were used to test the system repair cycle in Figure 10 and to test the
intrinsic OGA repair as shown below.
reset

clock
ce_ICAP
we_ICAP
din_ICAP
busy_ICAP
Out_ICAP

dataB

BlockRAM

PowerPC

Config
addrB

addrA dataA weA

start

Compact Flash

ICAP

System
ACE

Terminal Program

UART

length
PLB BUS

ML402
MOTHERBOARD

Video
Input

VGAIn

AD9887
IC
`

VIDEO IO
DAUGHTER
CARD

Input
Image
Buffer
(BRAM)
on
XCV2P7
FPGA

64-bit
VIOBUS

BUS
Macro

FE

BUS
Macro

BUS
Macro

FE

BUS
Macro

BUS
Macr
o

FE

BUS
Macro

VGA
Driver

AE

Output
Image Buffer
(BRAM) on
XCV4SX35
FPGA

XCV4SX35 FPGA

VGAOut
Video
Output

Figure 13: Use Case Physical Design using Xilinx VSK Platform
The PC and JTAG prototype is only meant as a testing environment for SMART. The
convenience and performance of using a PC to run the GA APIs and the communication
applications have greatly reduced development time and validation effort. However, deploying
the host PC with SMART will actually eliminate any benefit for such system, either from power
or reliability points of view. Therefore, we believe that the system will not realize its original
design goals unless it is deployed on a PowerPC processor that comes embedded within the
majority of the high-end Xilinx FPGA boards. Many successful PowerPC deployment efforts for
fault-tolerant systems have been reported in literature, especially ones that employ evolutionary
repair techniques.

In [97], the design and implementation of an intrinsic evolution system is presented. The system
relies on online evaluation of fitness, i.e. using the functional input of the circuit in runtime. The
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GA was implemented in C (similar to OGA in this work), and was embedded on PowerPC 405
embedded processor on a Virtex-II device. Another approach is reported in [98] where a
PowerPC-based intrinsic GA and a workstation-based extrinsic GA are compared in term of the
fitness evaluation time. The intrinsic GA evolves image recognition system was implemented on
a PowerPC residing on a Virtex-II Pro FPGA, it was shown that it achieved fitness evaluation
speed comparable to software fitness evaluation that was run on a workstation operating on 30times the frequency of the PowerPC. One might consider using the soft-core that can be
configured on the FPGA, like Microblaze, to achieve similar goals. However, as [99]
demonstrates, soft cores will consume huge number of LUTs and would consume much more
power, they are also vulnerable to the same radiation effects that can affect other logic on the
board, making them far less appealing approach for fault-tolerant system implementations.
Finally, the ability of IBM PowerPC to process C/C++ code [100] mitigates the risk of porting
SMART into on-board implementation as all the GA and communication APIs in SMART are
based on ANSI/ISO standard, the only difference being the need to interface with the ICAP
rather than the parallel IV cable, which is completely supported by the PowerPC APIs [100].

5.2. Use Case Results
The following scenarios were tested successfully, these scenarios simulate a stuck-at fault at a
given FE using dip-switches on the FPGA board to demonstrate the system‟s ability to
autonomously detect, isolate, and repair the fault.

Scenario 1: Fault injection when the AE is disabled:
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1. The system runs in duplex mode, where two FEs are running the edge-detection
algorithm and the third one is in „cold standby‟ (inactive) mode.

2. DIP-switch 1 is OFF, indicating that the AE is disabled and will not be able to monitor
faults in the FEs

3. DIP-switch 2 (FE-1 fault injection) is turned ON. The edge detected image starts to show
faulty pixels and degradation in the quality of the image. Voter report is always ON-OFFON, indicating that the voter is disabled (That is because the AE is inactive)

Scenario-2: Fault injection when the AE is enabled:

1. The system runs in duplex mode, where two FEs are running the edge-detection
algorithm and the third one is in „cold standby‟ (inactive) mode.

2. DIP-switch 1 is ON, indicating that the AE is enabled and should be able to monitor
faults in the FEs

3. DIP-switch 2 (FE-1 fault injection) is turned ON. The edge detected image shows NO
faulty pixels and the quality of the image remains the same, this is due to the AE
intervention which can be summarized as follow:

a.

AE detects discrepancy in FE1. FE1 status becomes (Online and faulty)

b. AE enables FE3 and change its status from Offline to Online.
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c. AE enables the voter, the discrepancy report changes from (Voter disabled) to
(FE1 discrepant)

d. The output is taken from the majority vote and hence shows no degradation in the
performance

Scenario-3: Recovering the injected fault causes the system to shift to Duplex mode again.

1. Starting from Scenario-2 output: a Triplex system in which FE1 is faulty.

2. DIP-switch 2 (FE-1 fault injection) is turned OFF again, indicating that the fault is
recovered.

3. The voter report LEDs change from (FE1 discrepant) to (No discrepancy).

4. After 5-second window without any discrepant readings, the AE realizes that the fault is
recovered and the TMR mode is not needed anymore, it disables FE3 (status changes
from Online to Offline) and the Voter (status changes from No discrepancy to Voter
disabled).

Figure 14 (a) shows the sample input satellite image of urban buildings having industrial factory
fans along with the fault-free result of real-time processing of that image using the Sobel edge
detection algorithm. Figure 14 (b) depicts the scenario of single-fault in the data path that can be
simulated using switches 2, 3, or 4 as defined in Table 7. Upon the detection of the discrepancy
caused by the fault, the RARS switches to the TMR configuration, thereby allowing the system
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to maintain 100% of its fault-free throughput. Hence there is no degradation in quality as
compared to the fault-free scenario. Figure 14 (c) depicts the impact of another stuck-at fault at a
different FE, in which case system performance drops, as can be seen from the degraded edgedetected image. When the software monitoring layer initiates the refurbishment of one of the
faulty FEs through PR, the system regains 100% performance, as shown in Figure 14 (d). Thus,
the application throughput is restored using hardware identification of resource capabilities and
autonomous refurbishment.

Figure 14 (a): Fault-free Scenario

Figure 14 (b): single-fault Scenario

Figure 14 (c): Two faulty FEs Scenario

Figure 14 (d): After-repair scenario

Figure 14: Original and Edge-detected Images under Different RARS Configurations
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The intrinsic bitstream evolution targeted eight LUTs in the entire FE design. These LUTs were
selected after investigating the different impacts that each LUT selection might have on overall
system performance. Based on preliminary experiments, we were able to extract the critical
LUTs [85] that are highly influential for the performance of the Edge Detector circuit.

The average fitness and best fitness values per generation averaged over 20 runs, along with the
standard deviation for both values are shown in Figure 9. The maximum fitness value is 2,047
(

), which means that out of 2,047 discrepancy reading, the evolved FE does not show any

discrepancy when its output is compared to the other configured fault-free FE outputs.

The maximum fitness value in this work is 2047; this value does not actually denote the number
of possible output combinations as in most conventional circuit evolution approaches. Instead, it
indicates the number of discrepancies between the outputs of the evolved FE compared to
another fault-free FE. To establish enough significance in the reported fitness value, the
application records the number of discrepancies over a window of 65,536 evaluations, which
denotes the number of pixels in one 256x256 video frame for the use case under study. Due to
the message width limitation which confined the fitness value field width to 11 bits only, the
hardware implemented a scaling scheme in which the actual number of evaluations of 65,536
values was scaled down by 32 to fit the field width of 11. This means that the circuit is actually
evaluated for 65,536 input combinations where each 32 discrepancies are translated into 1 point
on the normalized fitness scale. This technique provides wide evaluation window for the OGA to
span one full frame, yet avoids high transmission bandwidth for fitness reporting between the
hardware and software. Another approach to expand the evaluation window while keeping the 11
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bit field width is to poll the fitness values for a predefined number of times in the OGA API and
then average the readings or possibly detect and eliminate outliers, this software solution
provides a way to control the number of evaluations needed to assess the evolved individual‟s
fitness. Finally, the message width of 16bit is just an arbitrary selection for the experimental
extension of SMART. In real application, the message width can be extended to 32 or even 64
bits, allowing for largest fitness value field and thus accommodating wider evaluation window.
Table 9: Fitness and Timing Information for Twenty GA Runs
Run #

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Average
Standard
deviation
Confidence
Alpha
95%
Confidence
Interval

Final Fitness

Timing information

Best

Avg

Number of
Generations

Total Fitness
Evaluation
Time (sec)

Total FPGA
Configuratio
n Time (sec)

Total Genetic
Operators
Time (usec)

2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047
2047

2033
2043
2006
2015
1989
2001
2005
2020
2044
2032
2000
1998
2018
2044
2046
2045
2007
1993
2015
2044
2019.90
19.80

147
217
78
156
99
148
152
126
252
71
221
162
103
129
177
161
75
233
62
202
148.55
56.73

23.69
35.27
12.13
25.34
15.96
24.09
25.01
20.50
41.27
11.46
35.99
26.27
16.65
21.18
29.01
78.80
12.18
38.11
9.99
33.42
26.82
15.40

83.50
111.97
35.65
81.74
50.09
77.40
79.34
63.76
127.01
36.00
112.49
75.82
51.19
64.89
91.33
84.85
39.00
117.43
31.93
98.78
75.71
29.00

2098.75
3172.50
1106.88
2421.88
1470.00
2205.00
2170.63
1835.94
3686.56
984.38
3093.75
2364.69
1530.00
1920.00
2585.00
2250.00
1133.13
3480.00
876.88
2826.56
2160.63
825.48

0.95
0.05
(2011.2,
2028.5)

0.95
0.05
(123.69,173.41)

0.95
0.05
(20.07,33.57)

0.95
0.05
(63.00,88.42)

0.95
0.05
(1798.8,2522.4)
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Table 10: OGA Parameters used in Experiments
Parameter
Population size
Mutation rate
Elitism size
Crossover rate
Tournament size

2500

Value
10
0.3
1
0.8
2

Best Fitness

Average Fitness

Stdev of Best Fitness

Stdev of Average Fitness

Fitness

2000
1500
1000
500
0
0

50

100

150

200

250

Generations

Figure 15: OGA Best and Average Fitness Results

Table 9 shows details of the 20 runs that are averaged in Figure 15. All runs converged to a final
solution based on the OGA parameters listed in Table 10. These parameters were determined
using preliminary experiments with analysis of variance (ANOVA) study of the interaction effect
between the parameters. We found that these parameter settings produced the best GA
performance for this particular application and settings. The average number of generations
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required to repair the fault for the 20 runs is 148 generations, while the 95% confidence interval
is between 123 and 173 generations. Thus, 95% of the time, a repair happens in less than 173
generations.

The runs produced very small deviation in the average fitness of the population; this is partly due
to the small population size. The table also shows the timing information for fitness evaluation,
PR time, and genetic operator overhead. Although we used PR, the configuration time was still
the dominant factor in repair time. For example, the first run required 83.5 seconds of
reconfiguration time for a total of 147 generations, which means that each generation required
seconds to configure a population of 10 individuals, resulting in 56.8 msec
per bitfile. This is close to the theoretical value obtained by dividing the bitstream size by the
Cable speed (

). This value accounts only for CBS transmission

time, but in reality, there is a 95% probability that the configuration time will take 64 to 88 msec.

Table 11 compares the edge detection evolutionary approach that was implemented in this work
to three edge-detector evolution attempts [56, 62, 63]. The model-free fitness function provides
an application-independent approach as compared to the complex fitness functions adopted by
the others. The simplicity and straightforwardness of the discrepancy-based fitness function was
another plus compared to the complicated fitness functions used by other approaches, though
OGA aims to repair faulty edge-detectors rather than design them from scratch or from a
preliminary template. SMART is the only approach that demonstrated edge-detector evolution on
the actual hardware, other methods used software models to evaluate the fitness.
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Table 11: Comparison between SMART and Other Edge Detection Evolution Techniques
Hollingworth [63]

Gudmundsson
[56]

Ross [62]

RARS

Application

Generic images
(fairly simple)

Methodology

Exploit inherent
parallelism in images

Unfragmented,
localized thin edges
in medical images.
Split image into
linked sub-images.
Maintain links
between adjacent
pixels.

Generic (satellite
images, uniform
patterns, and so on).
Evolve a subset of
the Edge Detector
(i.e., critical LUTs)
to recover from
faults.

Fitness
Evaluation
Evolutionary
Algorithm

Software model

Software model

Microscopic
images from
mineral samples.
Implement a
training stage
(requires
sampling 23.6%
of image),
followed by
genetic
programming.
Software model

Genetic
programming.

2D Genetic
Algorithm with
problem-specific
operators.

Genetic
String
Coding

Four node functions
(i.e., and, or, not, and
xor) and eight
terminal values for
pixels around the
evolved pixel.

Edge map. Image
pixels are masked
with corresponding
values in pixel map
(i.e., 0: no edge, 1:
edge).

Fitness
Function

Pratt figure of merit
(PFM) relative to
fault-free Sobel edge
detector

Highly complex
cost function based
on five cost factors.

Evolution
Speed

Partial solution in
2,333 generations
after 24 hours of
evolution time.

Best Fitness

Not reported

2,300 generations
used for ring
imaging; 300
generations used
for thin, welllocalized edges.
0.85 PFM with
scaling factor of
0.01.
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Genetic
programming
training (~25%)
and evolution
(~75%).
High-level
functions (i.e.,
avg, min, max,
and stdev).
Terminal pixels
and high-level
ephemerals (i.e.,
gradient and
intensity).
Biased random
sampling fitness
evaluation for
training. Program
fitness is similar
to PFM.
75 generations,
with 25% of
images used for
training. Very
large population
size of 2,000.
0.590 for Image 1;
0.633 for Image 2.

Intrinsic evolution
on the hardware
Genetic algorithm.

Direct bitstream
evolution. The
solution coding is
the actual bitfile.

Model-free, triplex
discrepancy-based
function. No
application-specific
a priori knowledge
needed.
148 generations,
with low population
size of 10. Evolved
8 critical LUTs.

100% as compared
to output from faultfree Sobel edge
detector.

5.3. The Relationship between RARS and the OGA
RARS is the hardware organic component of SMART. Its primary purpose is masking transient
faults that result from SEU in the user logic until the affected user register is re-written with a
new value from subsequent operations. In addition, RARS helps maintaining correct functional
output even in the case of soft faults in the configuration logic, until the scrubber re-downloads
the CBS and corrects the upset. However, In the case of hard faults, RARS cease to be efficient
as it does not have the mean to find alternative paths to circumvent faulty LUTs. Here comes the
role of the OGA, which will be invoked by SMART‟s controller to realize solutions even in the
case of hard faults. Still, RARS plays significant role in hard-fault repair by interacting with the
OGA in the following ways:

1. As the OGA is a guided heuristic search method that requires evaluating many
individuals until a good solution is found, and because the OGA performs online fitness
assessment, meaning that the evaluated individual is configured on the circuit and is
evaluated using the runtime functional inputs that drive the application, RARS conceal
the effect of evaluating suboptimal individuals by switching to TMR mode so that the
erroneous outputs of the evaluated individuals are overruled by other fault-free FEs, just
as if the evolved FE is affected by a transient fault. This will give the OGA enough time
to evolve optimal individual without affecting the functional operation of the circuit.

2. The OGA relies on the self-monitoring capabilities or RARS, which evaluates the
evolved FE and presents its fitness value to the OGA engine. The OGA by itself cannot
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assess the fitness of the intrinsically-evolved individual and thus needs to interact with
RARS.

To demonstrate this behavior, we applied a sequence of injected faults on RARS and monitored
the performance of the application. Then, we superimposed OGA repair experiments taken under
the same conditions to create a holistic experiment that exploits the two pieces together. The
precondition for this sequence of events is that hard fault MTTR should be greater than the
MTBF; this condition is almost always realized in space missions due to low MTTF in radiationhardened FPGA devices that employ epitaxial CMOS process technology to lessen the impact of
energetic particles hitting the silicon. As seen in the figure, the number of faulty FEs in RARS
increases from 1 to 2 to 3 by time, as there is no mechanism to repair hard faults. On the other
hand, hard faults in the FEs are corrected as they occur to maintain a number of faulty FEs less
than or equal to 1. With the help of RARS, this guarantees a steady 100% overall performance of
the application, even though the faulty FEs are being evaluated online with performance levels
down to 15% at some point of time. The non-OGA mode will eventually suffer degraded
operation when there is two or more faulty FEs. With 3 Faulty FEs, the overall performance of
RARS gets closer to 50%. The voter hits this performance level due to compensating fault
scenarios in which the FEs do not fail in the same way and thus can still vote for the correct
output in about 50% of the cases.
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Figure 16: Holistic Experiment Demonstrating the Interaction between RARS and OGA
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CHAPTER 6: AVAILABILITY, AREA, AND POWER EVALUATION
METRCIS

After successfully demonstrating the ability of SMART to self-repair simulated soft and hard
faults in a real edge-detection use case, we intend to evaluate its availability, area usage, and
energy consumption against standard and well-accepted evaluation metrics. The aim is to
demonstrate and quantify the benefit of SMART over other conventional fault-tolerance
approaches that rely on fixed redundancy and scrubbing. SMART has two main advantages:

1. Capability of handling hard faults: Most fault-tolerance systems ignore hard fault
handling because they are less frequent than soft ones. However, with NASA plans of
executing space missions that last for many years, the likelihood of radiation-induced
hard faults become higher and higher. Moreover, Xilinx reports that under stressful
thermal conditions, aging-related faults can happen after 3 years only [37], which makes
it unwise to just ignore hard faults specially in multi-million mission-critical systems.
SMART handles hard faults using an intrinsic evolutionary repair mechanism that have
been actually implemented and shown to successfully repair simulated hard faults, as
demonstrated in Section 5.2.

2. Adapting the redundancy based on the mission reliability and resource requirements:
TMR runs three times the user logic all the time to mask faults as they happen in very
small portions of the mission duration. This attribute can be really costly, especially in
term of energy consumption in very long space missions like deep space probes which
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use limited power sources that need to last for long periods. SMART design philosophy
is to provide adaptive level of redundancy by organically controlling which level to select
at runtime based on the mission requirements and the environment parameters.

Both advantages need to be properly evaluated using standard metrics. First, calculating MTTR
of hard faults and soft faults is not enough to judge SMART‟s abilities to sustain realistic
missions. Thus, based on published data and experimental measurements of SMART‟s
prototype, we formulated nine semi-hypothetical space missions to use in evaluation. Then,
CTMC was employed to simulate SMART‟s behavior in nine missions to calculate the overall
availability of the system and the time it spends in each repair stage. Finally, the common
convention in evaluation resource overhead against the industry-standard TMR approach is to
analytically assume that TMR requires 3 times the FEs‟ overhead plus the voter‟s overhead. This
however is not always the case due to the abundance of triplication optimization algorithms that
can do better than that. Thus, we relied on a standard triplication tool called BL-TMR to generate
28 benchmarks to be used in evaluating SMARTs overhead.

6.1. Semi-Hypothetical Use Cases
The first step to evaluate SMART‟s ability to sustain demanding long missions is to provide
semi-hypothetical use cases, meaning that the use cases are based on publically available data
but with the assumption that SMART architecture is used on board. Based on values reported in
published work and experimental results attained by SMART prototype, and to produce a set of
use cases (UCs) to use in examining SMARTs performance, we report the following:
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6.1.1. Soft-Fault Rate
CREME-96 simulator was used in [31] to calculate predicted Soft-Fault Rate (FS) per day for
different 90nm device type. Assuming Low Earth Orbit (LEO) with altitude of 800 KM and
inclination of 22.0 degree, the reported SEU rate per day is 7.56 for Xilinx XQR4VSX55 90nm
FPGA.

This device has 24,567 slices [10], each slice has two LUTs (G and F). Thus, the final rate for
SEU/LUT in hours is

. This value will be multiplied

by the number of LUTs in each FE to determine the soft fault rate in each FE per one simulation
hour.

6.1.2. Soft-Fault Repair Rate
We calculated the Soft-Fault Repair Rate (RS) based on scrubbing speed in the SMART JTAGbased prototype to account for the worst case scenario, which takes around 39.56 seconds to
initialize the boundary scan chain, download the bitstream, readback/verify the bitstream, and
evaluate the FE for a wide window of functional input to ensure the SUE is corrected in the CBS.

Even if ICAP is used to expedite the scrubbing process, the assumed value is still valid as one
can always expand the evaluation window for the repaired FE to gain higher statistical
confidence that the fault is indeed repaired.
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6.1.3. Hard-Fault Rate
In this work, Hard-Fault Rate (FH) is the rate of TDDB failures, due to many claims that
radiation-hardened Virtex devices are radiation-faults immune. Based on Xilinx Published data,
[36] predicts 10% of the LUTs in a circuit to be affected by TDDB per year under the most
stressful conditions of tox=1.2 nm, oxide area=0.25 mm2, at 125 C and 3.0 V. The static signal
probability is assumed to be 1 because the LUT is a lookup table that has all gates turned on all
the time.

For the sake of proper factorial experimental design, we assumed 3 levels of FS based on the
environmental conditions, where the fault rate under demanding conditions is assumed to be
10%, under moderate conditions is 5%, and under favorable condition is 1%. These values are
relative to the adjusted FE size that takes into consideration the resource decomposition rate such
that the FE ends up with 600 LUT/FE at the end of the mission time. The same aging rate
dictated the length of simulation time as the system cannot function for more than 10 years given
a hard fault rate of 10% of the LUTs per year.

6.1.4. Hard-Fault Repair Rate
Similar to FH case, we calculate three levels of Hard-Fault Repair Rate (RH) to establish full
3x3 factorial experiment, the three levels of RH were calculated based on simulation results for
OGA with different level of hard fault impact on the LUTs, where a hard fault can impact one,
two, or four bit(s) of the LUTs. The associated repair rates correspond to rapid, intermediate, and
lengthy repairs, respectively. The number of generations and the repair time/rate are depicted in
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Table 12 below. Conventional TMR and scrubbing techniques commonly found in the literature,
which do not have hard-fault repair, will have RH equals to infinity. Plugging finite large
numbers for RH in the CTMC model that we will demonstrate in the next section caused the
system to stay in faulty states from the point it is hit with a hard-fault until the end of the
mission, this is because there will be no way to bring the system back into healthy stats if no
hard-fault repair techniques are available. Thus, in CTMC analysis, we assumed the quick,
intermediate, and lengthy RH rates to demonstrate the impact of finite changes of MTTR of
hard-faults on the overall system behavior.
Table 12: OGA Results for Various Numbers of Hard Faults
Number of Faults
Generations
MTTR (hours)

1
3962
0.704415

2
31352
5.573703111

4
63307
11.25462

RH (hours)

1.4196177

0.17941393

0.0888524

The nine use cases and the simulation parameters are summarized in Table 13 below. The
resulting 3x3 experiments represent nine semi-hypothetical scenarios for different operating
conditions. RS and FS values are fixed for all 9 UCs; the variation that is seen in the table is due
to the different number of LUTs required for different experiments to accommodate the
decomposition rate of the LUTs. Only FH and RH are varied across the experiments as they
represent the main focus of this work and demonstrate the true contribution of SMART over
conventional repair techniques. The simulation time assumes that each year has 10,000 hours.
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Table 13: Fault and Repair Values of the Nine Use Cases
UC #

Description

FH
(per hour)

FS
(per hour)

RS
(per hour)

RH
(per hour)

Simulation
Time
(hours)

1

Demanding conditions
Rapid repair

0.065753425

0.038466235

90.91

1.4196177

10,000

2

Moderate conditions
Rapid repair

0.006027397

0.007052143

90.91

1.4196177

20,000

3

Favorable Conditions
Rapid Repair

0.000723288

0.004231286

90.91

1.4196177

60,000

4

Demanding conditions
Lengthy repair

0.065753425

0.038466235

90.91

0.0888524

10,000

5

Moderate conditions
Lengthy repair

0.006027397

0.007052143

90.91

0.0888524

20,000

6

Favorable Conditions
Lengthy Repair

0.000723288

0.004231286

90.91

0.0888524

60,000

7

Demanding conditions
Intermediate Repair

0.065753425

0.038466235

90.91

0.17941393

10,000

8

Moderate conditions
Intermediate Repair

0.006027397

0.007052143

90.91

0.17941393

20,000

9

Favorable Conditions
Intermediate Repair

0.000723288

0.004231286

90.91

0.17941393

60,000

6.2. Availability Analysis Using Markov Models
The first evaluation metric that we present to qualify SMART‟s benefit over conventional TMR
is reliability modeling using Continuous-time Markov Chains (CTMC). CTMC is a stochastic
modeling technique to predict a set of possible outcomes based on state-to-state transition
probabilities. The model has been recommended by IEC 61508 Standard for Functional Safety
of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems [101] as a way to
analyze failure modes of electronic devices. CTMC relies on a state-transition diagram that
depicts a state space of the chain, which is defined by all the states that the system can traverse
during its operation, along with the possible transitions between the states with each transition
being characterized by a transition probability. Based on these states and transitions, the model
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can be solved analytically or simulated experimentally to calculate the probability of being in
certain state based on the previous state. The steady-state solution can help quantifying the
probability of being in a certain state on the long run, which can be very useful in reliability and
safety modeling. Moreover, Monte Carlo simulation of the CTMC can predict the expected
transitions that the system is likely to undergo with time.

We intend to perform a comparative study using Markov tools to quantify the effect of having
hard-fault repair in mission critical applications. The system that we model is RARS, which has
three instances of the user applications and is capable of switching from duplex to triplex
configuration, and vice versa. The resulting Markov state transition diagram is shown in Figure
17. The state space consists of 10 different states, each represented by a circle in the diagram,
indicating the state number (Sn), the state condition (Good or Faulty), and the number of soft and
hard faulty FE‟s in that state, respectively. For instance, state S8 is said to be faulty because it
has all FE‟s faulty, two of which have soft faults and one has hard fault. The states belong to
vertical lanes that denote the total number of faulty FEs in RARS.

The possible transitions between the states are characterized by one of the following rates:

1. FS: Soft fault rate, denoting the SEU rate in the system

2. RS: Soft repair rate, this is the time needed to scrub the CBS to restore the correct value
of faulty LUTs

3. FH: Hard fault rate, which in this work signifies the TDDB fault rate

103

4. RH: Hard repair rate, this is the time that the OGA needs to repair faulty FEs.

0 Faulty FEs

1 Faulty FE

2 Faulty FEs

3 Faulty FEs

Good State

Good States

Bad States

Bad States

S2
1,0
Good

3*FS

2*FS
RS

S4
2,0
Faulty

FS
RS
FH
RH

2*FH
RS

RH

S1
0,0
Good

S5
1,1
Faulty

RH
S3
0,1
Good

2*FH
RH

FS
RS
FH
RH

2*FS
RS

3*FH

S7
3,0
Faulty

S8
2,1
Faulty

S9
1,2
Faulty

FS
RS
S6
0,2
Faulty

FH
RH

S10
0,3
Faulty

Figure 17: Markov State-Transition Diagram of RARS
The system starts from an initial state S1, which has 0 faulty FEs and is in the good state. A soft
fault can occur with a rate of FS to put the system in S2 (1,0), or a hard fault can occur with a
rate of FH to put the system in state S3 (0,1). RARS is expected to stay error-free even with the
existence of one faulty FE, at the expense of switching from the low power and area duplex
mode to the high power and area triplex mode. Thus, S1 is not different from S2 and S3 in term
of availability, but does consume less area and power. For all S n (n>3), RARS will be
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unavailable and will also consume high area and power similar to S2 and S3 because the triplex
configuration is needed during repair. Repairs, whether they are RS or RH, will move the system
from faulty states to healthier ones.

6.2.1. Markov Configuration
The black box view of the CTMC experiment is depicted in Figure 18 below. The inputs are
already explained in the previous sections; they will be varied based on the use case under study
as shown in Table 13. The first two outputs (Steady-State Availability and Steady-State Time in
State) do not actually require running any simulation; they can be analytically calculated by
solving a set of differential equations of the matrix representation of the CTMC. These steadystate solutions of the CTMC can serve as an indication of the long-term behavior of the model,
but they cannot be completely relied-upon in real engineering missions that run for finite periods
of time. Thus, we extended the CTMC work to include Monte Carlos simulation for finite
periods of operation with sufficient statistical significance to calculate the bottom three outputs
of the model.

FS
RS
FH
RH

Steady-State Availability
Steady-State Time in State
Cumulative Time in State

CTMC

Cumulative uptime/downtime

Mission Time
Availability = f(T, FS ,RS ,FH ,RH)

Figure 18: Functional Model of the CTMC Experiments
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To perform these simulations, we used a publically available operation research tool based on
Excel and VBA [102]. The tool provides an ample of features to perform various computations
on a CTMC; it includes a steady-state Markov solver, Monte Carlo simulator, and other useful
tools. The excel tool, as is, does not support running multiple simulations and reporting statistical
significance of the results. Therefore, we developed a VBA wrapper around the Monte Carlo
simulation module to aid in running multiple experiments for statistical significance purposes.
The wrapper executes multiple experiments and then processes the large amount of generated
data to calculate fixed-point time intervals for all runs based on a weighted average principle.
The goal is to unify all Monte Carlos runs to fixed-time units to be able to average runs and
provide confidence levels of the experiments. This post-processing step allowed the simulator to
execute its random time strides and thus enabled it to switch to various states based on the actual
transition probabilities.

6.2.2. Availability Evaluation Metric Results
Each use case was simulated 20 times to provide enough statistical significance. FH and RH are
physically independent as the hard fault arrival rate is an uncontrollable event for SMART,
whereas the repair mechanism is executed irrespective to the fault arrival assuming a single fault
scenario and MTTR<MTTF. Consequently, no ANOVA were required to analyze the interaction
effect of the experiment parameters. Table 14 below reports the 20-runs average of the
cumulative time in each state for all the UCs. The 20-runs produced low standard deviation
values for all calculated averages. To demonstrate the statistical significance of the results, we
provide all 95% confidence intervals (alpha=0.05) of the measured averages in Table 15.
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Table 14: Average of Cumulative Time in State for the Nine Use Cases
S

UC1

UC2

UC3

UC4

UC5

UC6

UC7

UC8

UC9

1

86617.1

197416

598992

11119

162040

585007

31157

180556

592712

2

110.433

45.2201

83.5574

14.3668

37.6925

81.7908

39.7021

42.2014

83.0391

3

12015.3

2516.95

24848.4

33194.18

0.09638

0.01509

0.01409

0.003113

5

10.3220

0.41594

21.1690

5.169533

14687.45
0.007519
5
1.313137

34308.25
0.049475
1
29.26737

18107.62
0.000390
6
2.807783

7144.62

4

923.3729
0.004101
5
0.090234

6

1096.85

20.7712

0.783642

36652.5

4428.781

221.4332

25121.46

1251.339

58.3688

7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8

0.09406

0.01069

0.0039

0.02598

0.00119

0.00468

0.04846

0.00312

0.00996

9
1
0

0.44219

0.00098

0

15.3885

0.323547

0.012548

10.60557

0.105731

0.00234

49.3238

0.09766

0

27229.0

293.4965

0.722656

9233.248

39.06087

1.36357

A

0.98842

0.999893

0.999998

0.36018

0.976361

0.999627

0.655709

0.993533

0.99989
9

0.01094
0.63295

Table 15: Standard Error (alpha=0.05) of Cumulative Time in State for the Nine Use Cases
S

UC1

UC2

UC3

UC4

UC5

UC6

UC7

UC8

1

54.0413

25.63603

20.806927

128.689

458.6283

219.3030

184.8870

177.1719

UC9
108.406
1

2

0.5206

0.4011

0.7582

0.2728

0.3856

0.6317

0.4579

0.4355

0.7836

3

47.7744

26.0467

20.9827

146.946

346.58

225.428

113.355

167.343

109.964

4

0.01364

0.008931

0.004485

0.00643

0.003586

0.006098

0.014215

0.000765

0.00592

5

0.21827

0.03558

0.02292

0.32728

0.17359

0.11659

0.23309

0.10955

0.05251

6

15.0511

2.201358

0.5452965

188.010

138.15027

26.15954

159.7461

55.86048

10.7571

7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8

0.0159

0.0062

0.0041

0.01

0.0016

0.0064

0.0102

0.0037

0.0066

9
1
0

0.04699

0.00191

0

0.28084

0.03692

0.00982

0.14724

0.02415

0.00316

5.32583
1.767
E-04

0.191403
1.087
E-05

0
9.2
E-07

226.063
2.1974
E-03

36.234844
8.072
E-04

1.169738
4.352
E-05

135.2700
2.1125
E-03

10.09050
2.728
E-04

2.25778
1.746
E-05

A

Table 14 can be of great importance in pre-deployment preparations as it can tell the system
designers where to focus in order to handle the common case scenarios. For instance, none of the
UCs has entered S7 (all 3 modules hit by SEU) due to the very low MTTR compared to the high
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MTTF in the soft fault case. This analysis can impact design decisions such as the interfacing
between the scrubber and the FEs or the number of ports in the reconfiguration ROM, as the
system is highly unlikely to scrub three FEs at the same time. Similar conclusions can be drawn
about S9 and S10 for UC3, and so on.

The availability of the nine UCs are reported in the last column of Table 14, it is clear that the
demanding conditions can greatly impact the system availability to levels below the accepted
state-of-the-art standards (UC4: A=36%, UC7: A=65.6%). A mission operating in such harsh
conditions must be equipped with quick repair mechanisms to be able to process the rapid arrival
rate, and thus be able to produce relatively higher availability rates such as UC1: A=98.8%.

The impact of lengthy repair is also demonstrated in Table 14. A rapid repair will move the
system from 98.6% availability under worst conditions, to three nines under moderate
conditions, to 6 nines under favorable conditions. This difference, yet apparently negligible at a
100% scale, can make the difference in mission-critical applications that require the highest
possible availability levels, especially when the mission is long enough to make these ones of
tenths grow into hundreds of hours of system downtimes, as we will show shortly. Similarly, the
impact of mission conditions on the performance of a particular fault-tolerance approach is great;
such impact can be demonstrated by scrutinizing the results of UC 4, 5, and 6 which all utilize
lengthy repair mechanisms. The mission conditions can elevate the system availability from 36%
to 99.9%, making a huge impact on the mission success rate.
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Table 14 only shows the cumulative time at the end of the simulation. To further explain the
behavior of the system, we plot the cumulative downtime of each use case versus the mission
time. The UCs need to be grouped by FH because the hard fault rate will impact the maximum
mission time. So, under the most demanding conditions of 10% of the LUT impacted by hard
faults each year, the system can live for 10 years maximum, after which all LUTs will be
impacted by faults.

Figure 19 shows the cumulative downtime of the system with time. The first two figures,
corresponding to the demanding and moderate conditions, are plotted on logarithmic Y-axis due
to the huge divergence in cumulative downtime of quick, moderate, and lengthy repairs. For
instance Figure 19.A shows that the mission that is equipped with quick repair mechanism
resulted in 1,000 hours of system downtime, whereas a system with lengthy repair resulted in
more than 60,000 hours of downtime, confirming the importance of efficient hard-fault repairs in
SMART.

On the other hand, Figure 19.C depicts the favorable mission conditions, it was plotted on a liner
scale because of the relatively marginal difference between the use cases with the rapid and
lengthy repairs. Even after running for 60 years, the system with the lengthy repair only
cumulated approximately 225 hours of downtime. One can argue that in such favorable
conditions a hard-fault repair mechanism would not be required, but this is really dependent on
the mission type. If this is an imagining application aiming to capture explorative images then we
might agree, but if the FE is designed for a more critical application, such as a power controller
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or security-critical encryption circuit, then 225 hours, a little more than 9 days, can be really a
significant period of time that can jeopardize the mission success rate.
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Figure 19: Cumulative Downtime under the Nine Use Cases

Figure 20 shows the availability of the nine use cases throughout the mission life time. The
impact of the hard-fault rate (mission conditions) on the system availability is readily
demonstrated. The system with lengthy repair shows A<0.4 under demanding conditions (Figure
20.A), close to 0.98 under moderate conditions (Figure 20.B), and 0.9996 under favorable
conditions (Figure 20.C). The availability of the use cases is also affected by the repair time as
shown in the three figures, especially when the fault rate is high to push RARS toward faulty
states without a repair mechanism with an MTTR that is low enough to bring it back to the
healthy states.
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Figure 20: Availability under the Nine Use Cases
Figure 21 shows the percentage of time spent in each of the 10 states under each of the nine use
cases. The 90 bars depicted in the figure shows huge variation and thus might be challenging to
visually grasp, it is still clear that use cases 4 and 7, with demanding conditions and lengthy and
intermediate repair, respectively, are the ones that register less presence in S1 and spend more
time in S6 and S10.

A practical way of studying Figure 21 is to combine the states based on their overall impact on
the mission status, meaning that S1 by itself a distinguished state which guarantees that the
system is available (no faulty FEs) and is running in reduced power and area modes through the
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exploitation of the reconfiguration property of the FPGA to downgrade the redundancy level to
duplex, with discrepancy monitoring to detect faults. A less desirable stats of the system in seen
in S2 and S3, where the system is still available via triplex configuration of RARS, yet consume
more power and area than S1, availability in these two states is exactly equal to S1 availability,
but the system is less reliable as it cannot handle any further faulty FEs. The remaining states
from S4 to S10 represent the least desirable system condition where it expends the triplex power
and area yet is not sufficiently available. A design goal of SMART is to minimize the time spent
in S4 to S10.
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Figure 21: Percentage of Time in Each State under the Nine Use Cases
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Another important conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 21 is that the faulty states that are
actually traversed throughout the mission lifetime are the ones that comprise hard faults, which
are S3, S6, and S10. This can be attributed to the high MTTR for hard faults compared to soft
faults. The states that feature soft faults are visibly negligible (though they were actually
traversed), because SMART is able to exit them in very short time by applying PR-based
scrubbing. In fact, Table 14 shows that S7 which represents three soft-faulty FEs was never
visited even with very long simulation times (60 years), a clear indication that conventional
repair techniques can efficiently handle soft faults, steering the attention to hard-fault repair as a
vital requirement for autonomous fault-handling in mission critical systems running in harsh
environments.

Finally, to quantify the aggregation of the states of RARS, Figure 22 depicts the percentage of
time spent on each of the operation phases under the nine use cases. (A) with lower power and
area represents S1, (A) with high power and area combines S2 and S3, whereas (1-A)
corresponds to states S4-S10. UC 3 with favorable conditions and rapid repair has almost
negligible (1-A) presence, UCs 5 and 7 with demanding conditions and lengthy and intermediate
repair, respectively, are the ones that spend time in (1-A) more than in (A), other use cases show
mixed behaviors that correlates to the reaction time to faults and their arrival rates. Such figure
can be constructed based on the mission expected conditions and the fault-tolerance system
prototype results to predict the availability and the overhead associated with a particular mission,
such level of prediction and control is greatly desired in multi-million missions that are required
to maintain their objectives according to high standards.
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Figure 22: Operational Phases Distribution under the Nine Use Cases

6.3. Area and Power Comparison to industry-standard Techniques
The benefit of RARS over conventional TMR approaches in reconfigurable devices is that
RARS actually makes use of the reconfigurability feature of the FPGA devices by selectively
adding or removing the FEs based on the mission status and requirement. This comes at the
expense of adding a small controller, which is the AE, to RARS, incurring certain overhead,
called Overhead of Autonomic Element (OAE), over what a conventional TMR would require.
However, if the mission conditions are favorable enough not to introduce any faults, RARS can
theoretically save

compared to the conventional TMR that will consume power

and area of an unused third FE. The duplex mode is assumed as a minimal requirement here to
allow for fault detection through discrepancy detection. The overhead in this context can refer to
any quantity that incur burden on the mission, such as area, power, cost, effort, etc…
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Referring to the CTMC experiment in the previous section, we define Time in State 1 (TS1) as the
period of time in which RARS is in S1 and thus offers power and area saving over TMR while
providing the same level of availability. The component difference between RARS and TMR is
shown in Figure 23 below. Operating in S1 (Duplex) will save the overhead of one FE and one
Voter, but will still consume extra overhead for the AE component. Running in the triplex mode
(1- TS1) will cause RARS to expend more power and area than TMR because of the added
overhead of the AE, which is not required in a conventional TMR.

TMR
FE
FE

RARS
FE

V

FE

V
AE

Duplex operation
TS1

AE
FE

FE

FE
FE

Difference

FE
V

AE

Triplex Operation
(1-TS1)

AE

FE
V

FE

FE

Figure 23: Component Differences between RARS and TMR
Let the quantities of interest be denoted as shown in Table 16:
Table 16: Overhead Analysis Quantities Definition
Term
OFE

Definition
Overhead of one FE

OAE
OV
OTMR
ORARS
ODX
OTX
OS

Overhead of AE (without the voter component)
Overhead of the voter
Overhead of the TMR
Overhead of RARS
Overhead of RARS when it runs the duplex mode
Overhead of RARS when it runs the triplex mode
Overhead saving by using RARS over conventional TMR
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The Overhead of RARS is a weighted average controlled by T S1:

(1)

The duplex overhead is two times the FE overhead plus the AE overhead, whereas the triplex
overhead is three times the FE overhead plus the AE and the voters overhead:

(2)

(3)

The goal is to calculate the overhead savings of RARS compared to TMR.

(4)

6.3.1. Experimental Setup
We have selected power and area as the two overhead metrics of interest in this work due to their
quantifiable nature and direct impact on mission resources, and then we have compared RARS to
various TMR configurations in term of the expected dynamic power consumption and the area
requirements. We employed XPA [19] to measure the dynamic power consumption for the
different system components. The XPA is part of the Xilinx ISE design suite and provides a way
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to analyze the power profile of post-PAR designs, which is an advantage over the other
alternative tool, Xilinx Power Estimators (XPE) [19], which relies only on mapping reports and
thus ignores the details of the placement and routing in estimating power consumption. As for
area requirement, the Xilinx flow generates the PAR report that includes a detailed description of
the number of LUTs and other FPGA constructs that the design uses.

The power and area results for the edge detection application that we developed were extracted
experimentally from the XPA and the PAR reports. As for the TMR benchmark results that we
intend to compare against, we have employed the automated design triplication tool, BL-TMR
[18], which is a JAVA-based open-source tool that handles the generation of redundancy in
FPGA designs in order to improve system availability.

The BL-TMR tool is an EDIF-based one, which means that its primary input is the EDIF file,
which is a non vendor-specific format to represent and exchange netlists and schematics of
electronic circuits. EDIF generation is embedded in the Xilinx flow using the NGD2EDIF tool
that can generate EDIF representation of the design from the Native Generic Database (NGD)
file. The resulting EDIF file can undergo the triplication process of BL-TMR to generate the
triplicated EDIF, which can be translated back to the Xilinx process file formats using the
EDIF2NGD tool. This custom triplication flow is depicted in Figure 24 below, where the normal
Xilinx flow is interrupted right after it generates the NGD file in order to apply the triplication
using the BL-TMR redundancy generation flow.
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Figure 24: Custom TMR-Insertion Flow Based on Integrated BL-TMR and Xilinx Flows
The BL-TMR redundancy generation flow starts by executing the JAVA JEdifBuild tool, which
takes the EDIF file as converted by NGD2EDIF and generates an intermediate jedif file that will
be used throughout the redundancy injection process. Then, the jedif file is analyzed using the
JEdifAnalyze tool in order to learn the Input Output Buffers (IOBs) and the feedback paths of the
design, the resulting analysis is stored in a circuit description file (cdesc) for further use by the
tool.

Then, the JEdifNMRSelection tool is executed to select which parts of the user circuit to
replicate. This tool is run in passes, each pass aims to perform further replication selection steps,
including the redundancy degree (duplication or triplication) or the replication options (clocks,
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IO, instances, etc…). The output of this tool is written to a replication description file (.rdesc) for
further processing by the tool.

After that, the JEdifVoterSelection tool is invoked to decide the locations of the voters that will
be inserted to accomplish triplication, using different voter insertion algorithm. Finally, the
JEdifNMR tool is invoked to actually triplicate the design based on the specified options in all
the previous steps. The triplicated design is saved into an EDIF file and can be ported back to the
Xilinx flow using the EDIF2NGD tool.

In order to establish enough confidence when comparing RARS to other triplication approaches,
we employed various triplication settings along with various voter insertion algorithms. The
following list depicts the TMR configurations that will be used in the comparison.

Voter Insertion location:

1. Triplicate Logic (TL): Only internal logic, including clock signals, will be triplicated,
without triplication of the IOs

2. Triplicate Logic and Input ports (TLI): The logic and the input ports will be triplicated

3. Triplicate Logic and Output ports (TLO): the logic and the output ports will be triplicated

4. Triplicate Logic, Input, and Output ports (TLIO): Triplicates all logic, input, and output
signals.
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Voter Insertion Algorithm:

1. Voters before Every Flip-Flop (FF) Algorithm: This algorithm will place a voter before
the data input of every FF. The algorithm is very simple and does not require heavy
analysis of the design, it guarantees that only one voter will be inserted in any timing
path, reducing the negative timing impact of the triplication [18]

2. Voters after Every FF Algorithm: Similar to the previous algorithm, but inserts the voter
after the FF. This has produced the best timing results out of 15 benchmark designs [18]

3. Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition Algorithm: Applies
Kosaraju algorithm [18] to remove all feedbacks from the SCC. Runs quickly but
produces bad timing results compared to the other algorithms because it allows more than
one voter in the timing path.

4. Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition Algorithm: Reduces the number of voters using a
heuristic search to find nets with high fanout as candidate places to insert voters.

5. Highest FF Fanout SCC Decomposition Algorithm: Combines 4 and 2, it guarantees that
only one highest fanout voter is inserted per timing path, by inserting it after the FF
outputs, resulting in cutting more voters and thus protecting the timing paths and saving
more area.

122

6. Highest FF Fanin Input: Finds the highest fan-in FF in the SCC that is a legal voter
location.

7. Highest FF Fanin Output: Same as 6, but inserts the voter after the identified FF.

This has resulted in

triplicated designs, shown in Table 17, as benchmarks to be

used in the comparison against RARS.

6.3.2. Experimental Results
The BL-TMR tool was run 28 times to generate triplicated designs of the FEs with the
specification listed in Table 17. The resulting designs were first analyzed using the Xilinx PAR
reporting tools to calculate the area overhead of each benchmark. The full results are shown in
Table 18. We rely on the “Total equivalent gate count” as generated by the Xilinx tool to be the
area overhead metric in this experiment. Benchmark number 5 (Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC
Decomposition, Logic Only) resulted in the least number of gates, meaning it is the top design in
the area category out of the 28 benchmarks.

The expected used area in RARS is a function of T S1, ODX, and OTX, as shown in Eq.1. TS1 will
be first theoretically set to different values of interest to analyze the behavior of RARS as an
area-saver redundancy-based fault tolerance method. It will be later set to the values reported
under the nine UCs that we presented in the CTMC experiments in the previous section to
actually calculate RARS area requirements under those conditions.
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But to start with, ODX and OTX must be calculated by synthesizing the sub-modules of RARS
independently and generating the Xilinx PAR reports accordingly. The results of the FE, AE, and
Voter areas are shown in Table 19.
Table 17: 28 BL-TMR Triplicated Edge Detector Benchmarks
Benchmark
1

Triplication
Location

Voter Insertion Algorithm
Before Every Flip-Flop

2

After Every Flip-Flop

3
4

logic only

Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition
Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition

5

Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC Decomposition

6

Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Input

7

Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Output

8

Before Every Flip-Flop

9

After Every Flip-Flop

10
11

logic and input
ports

Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition
Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition

12

Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC Decomposition

13

Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Input

14

Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Output

15

Before Every Flip-Flop

16

After Every Flip-Flop

17
18

logic and output
ports

Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition
Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition

19

Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC Decomposition

20

Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Input

21

Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Output

22

Before Every Flip-Flop

23

After Every Flip-Flop

24
25

logic, input, and
output ports

Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition
Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition

26

Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC Decomposition

27

Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Input

28

Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Output
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Table 18: Area Results of the Twenty Eight Benchmarks
Benchmark

Slices

1

1,294

4
input
LUTs
2,148

2

1,320

2,144

3

1319

4

Logic 4
input LUTs

Route-thru 4
input LUTs

bonded
IOBs

BUFG

Total equivalent
gate count

1,878

270

63

1

20,629

1,991

153

63

1

21,307

2148

1932

216

63

1

20,953

1237

2006

1787

219

63

1

20,083

5

1182

1925

1769

156

63

1

19,975

6

1260

2079

1809

270

63

1

20,215

7

1185

1928

1772

156

63

1

19,993

8

1297

2173

1903

270

107

3

20,779

9

1323

2145

1992

153

107

3

21,313

10

1323

2149

1933

216

107

3

20,959

11

1240

2007

1788

219

107

3

20,089

12

1185

1926

1770

156

107

3

19,981

13

1264

2080

1810

270

107

3

20,221

14

1188

1929

1773

156

107

3

19,999

15

1343

2229

1959

270

145

1

21,771

16

1,416

2,289

2,136

153

145

1

22,833

17

1,357

2,109

1,893

216

145

1

21,375

18

1,256

1,980

1,761

219

145

1

20,583

19

1,200

1,899

1,743

156

145

1

20,475

20

1,304

2,037

1,767

270

145

1

20,619

21

1,203

1,902

1,746

156

145

1

20,493

22

1,370

2,253

1,983

270

189

3

21,915

23

1,434

2,289

2,136

153

189

3

22,833

24

1,388

2,109

1,893

216

189

3

21,375

25

1,275

1,980

1,761

219

189

3

20,583

26

1,218

1,899

1,743

156

189

3

20,475

27

1,339

2,037

1,767

270

189

3

20,619

28

1,221

1,902

1,746

156

189

3

20,493
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Table 19: Area Results of RARS Sub-Modules

Module
One FE
AE
(without
Voter)
Voter

Slices
348

4
input
LUTs
616

Logic 4 input
LUTs
526

route-thru 4
input LUTs
90

bonded
IOBs
64

BUF
Gs
1

Total
equivalent
gate count
6,495

86

151

136

15

210

2

2,125

71

107

107

0

169

1

1,183

Substituting the values in Eq.2 and Eq.3, ADX=15,115 gates, ATX=22,793 gates. ARARS can be
calculated for any given TS1. Table 20 shows ARARS for various TS1 and the saving over
benchmark 5 that has the smallest area out of the 28 benchmarks.
Table 20: RARS Area Savings over Benchamrk Five for Different TS1 Values
TS1
0%

ARARS
(in Gates)
22793

Area Saving of RARS
over Benchmark 5
-14.11%

1%

22716.22

-13.72%

10%

22025.2

-10.26%

20%

21257.4

-6.42%

30%

20489.6

-2.58%

36%

20028.92

-0.27%

37%

19952.14

0.11%

40%

19721.8

1.27%

50%

18954

5.11%

60%

18186.2

8.96%

70%

17418.4

12.80%

80%

16650.6

16.64%

90%

15882.8

20.49%

98%

15268.56

23.56%

99%

15191.78

23.95%

100%

15115

24.33%
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One can see that the TS1 threshold after which RARS becomes beneficial in term of area is 37%.
Missions that run 90% of the time in the Duplex mode (S1) can benefit from 20% area savings
for the design example of the edge detector. To generalize the area saving potential over a
spectrum of TS1values, we depict the relation between the total equivalent gate count of RARS
and TS1. On top of that, we overlay the 28 triplication benchmarks area results on a secondary xaxis, the results show that RARS will become more beneficial than all the TMR benchmarks
when TS1 is approximately greater than 40%.

RARS

BL-TMR

BL-TMR Benchmarks
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425262728

23000
Total Equivalent Gate Count

22000
21000
20000
19000

18000
17000
16000
15000
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0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

T
S1

Figure 25: RARS Area Overhead Relative to Twenty Eight Benchmarks
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Next, the XPA tool was used to analyze the dynamic power consumption of the same 28
benchmark designs. From the results that are reported in Table 21, it was noted that the dynamic
power consumption is greatly affected by the presence of triplicated IO‟s, and thus the results of
TLIO sets were only considered to select the power winner design to be fair to RARS, which
triplicates the input and output ports. Therefore, the winning benchmark in the power category is
benchmark 22 with 166.32 mWatt.

Table 21: Power Results (in mWatt) for the Twenty Eight Benchmarks
Benchmark
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Clock
10.96
11.19
13.43
12.14
12.77
12.49
11.46
21.01
23.1
19.25
18.6
18.24
19.13
16.48
14.88
12.07
13.64
14.01
11.24
13.96
13.15
18.89
27
21.7
19.28
21.7
22.86
18.95

Input
15.59
15.59
15.59
15.59
15.59
15.59
15.59
46.76
46.76
46.76
46.76
46.76
46.76
46.76
15.59
15.59
15.59
15.59
15.59
15.59
15.59
46.76
46.76
46.76
46.76
46.76
46.76
46.76

Output
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
31.15
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
93.45
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Logic
2.48
1.23
2.36
1.99
1.94
2.45
1.77
3.89
2.1
3.22
2.86
2.8
3.32
2.63
2.63
1.67
2.38
2.03
1.97
2.47
1.8
3.05
2.53
3.24
2.89
2.84
3.33
2.67ss

Signals
5.24
4.19
5.09
4.55
5.13
5.26
5.01
3.39
5.47
4.87
4.6
5.54
5.46
5.21
6.03
4.26
5.07
4.83
4.98
5.07
5.3
4.17
6.26
5.56
5.25
5.83
5.8
5.7

Total
65.42
63.35
67.62
65.42
66.58
66.94
64.98
106.2
108.58
105.25
103.97
104.49
105.82
102.23
132.58
127.04
130.13
129.91
127.23
130.54
129.29
166.32
176
170.71
167.63
170.58
172.2
167.53

Again, the same values were calculated for RARS sub-modules by synthesizing them
independently and applying the XPA analysis to the resulting designs. The results, shown in
Table 22, indicates that the majority of the dynamic power is consumed by the FE elements due
to the amount of logic used in it compared to the AE and the Voter. The Voter and the AE
consumed relatively equal amounts of dynamic power.
Table 22: Power Results for RARS Sub-Modules
Module
FE
Voter
AE (without Voter)

Clock
6.2
4.38
4.77

Input
15.59
0
0

Output
31.15
0
0

Logic
1.11
0.52
0.6

Signals
1.69
0.12
0.37

Total
55.74
5.02
5.74

Applying Eq.2 and Eq.3, we calculate PDX=117.22 mWatts and PTX=177.98 mWatts. PRARS can
be calculated for any given TS1. Table 23 shows PRARS for selected TS1 values and the power
savings over benchmark 22 that consumed the least dynamic power in the eight TLIO
benchmarks. The cutoff value for the power case is 20%, so any mission that stays in S1 for
more than one fifth of the time will benefit from RARS to reduce power consumption while
maintaining the same availability levels compared to the conventional TMR.
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Table 23: RARS Power Savings over Design Twenty Two for Different TS1 Values
TS1
0%
1%
10%
19%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
98%
99%
100%

Power
177.98
177.3724
171.904
166.4356
165.828
159.752
153.676
147.6
141.524
135.448
129.372
123.296
118.4352
117.8276
117.22

Power Saving of RARS
over Benchmark 22
-7.01%
-6.65%
-3.36%
-0.07%
0.30%
3.95%
7.60%
11.26%
14.91%
18.56%
22.22%
25.87%
28.79%
29.16%
29.52%

Plotting the Power in mWatts versus T S1 will show linear savings with increased duplex time. In
comparison with the 28 benchmarks, RARS can still be beneficial for power savings unless TLI
or TL are used, but this would decrease the reliability of the design because not all IOBs are
triplicated, introducing many failure points to the system.

130

RARS

BL-TMR

BL-TMR Benchmarks

T

1

0.9
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Figure 26: RARS Power Overhead Relative to Twenty Eight Benchmarks

Figure 27 depicts the percentage of power and area savings of RARS over the top two
benchmarks, 5 and 22, except for the power of design 5 which does not include IOBs and thus
produced very low power consumption at the expense of less reliability. All the three lines enter
the positive region of the Y axis at T S1>37%. If the power is the main concern of the mission
then any TS1>20% will mean that RARS will be more beneficial than any BL-TMR generated
designs.
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Area Saving Over Design 5
Area Saving Over Design 22

Power Saving Over Design 22
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0.08
0.12
0.16
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0.24
0.28
0.32
0.36
0.4
0.44
0.48
0.52
0.56
0.6
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0.68
0.72
0.76
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0.92
0.96
1

0.00%

-20.00%

TS1

Figure 27: RARS Area and Power Savings Relative to the Top Two Benchmarks

Note that the previous power analysis ignores the impact of the power consumption of the
reconfiguration process. The power analysis aims to compare between the conventional TMR
and the RARS approaches. This comparison only covers the organic hardware behavior of
RARS; it does not actually include scrubbing for repairing soft faults or GA for repairing hard
faults. We expect both TMR and RARS to follow the same reconfiguration pattern if they are
designed to go into the scrubbing or the GA phases. In fact, RARS implement a TMR
configuration when running the GA in order to use the discrepancy-based fitness evaluation
feature. Thus, both approaches will be affected in the same fashion if the GA reconfiguration
power consumption is considered.
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As for the RARS Duplex-to-Triplex switching power, neglecting the reconfiguration process
power consumption can only be acceptable if the configuration time is very low compared to the
application running time, which can be achieved by two ways.

First, by reducing the bitstream size through the use of PR rather than the full configuration
approach. As we demonstrated in the experimental section, the bitstream size was reduced using
the PR flow to 30.61 KB compared to 1.633 MB for the full static bitstream. This reduction in
the CBS size led to decreasing the reconfiguration time to 1.8% of the original value, which
should translate into comparable power saving during the reconfiguration process.

Second, the configuration time can be vastly reduced by relying on the much-faster ICAP instead
of the external configuration ports such as the JTAG. As mentioned previously, and in spite of
the usage of the parallel Cable IV in the experimental setup, the intended deployment platform
which will utilize the PowerPC processor will make use of the ICAP for all reconfigurations. The
ICAP can reach download speed of up to 400MB/Sec compared to the 5MB/Sec for the parallel
Cable IV that we used in experimental setup. The problem that faces most designers is that this
speed is bounded by the limiting factor of fetching the CBS from the configuration memory into
the ICAP with the same rate. Thus, the ICAP is able to support the maximum throughput of 400
MB/Sec, but the bottleneck becomes how fast the application can fetch the configuration data
from the memory.

Several efforts in the literature have implemented CBS fetching mechanisms to match the speed
of the ICAP. In [103], an implementation of BRAM next to the ICAP along with a finite state
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machine (FSM) to drive the memory load operations into the ICAP are presented. The resulting
system was able to write 4-byte words to the ICAP at a frequency of 100MHz, matching the
maximum throughput made available by the ICAP. In [4], the lightweight hardware artNOCICAP interface is developed to support fast Readback-Modify-Writeback (RMW) mechanism
that achieves 40us configuration time per frame, again matching the maximum speed of the
ICAP. Another successful approach to match the ICAP speed is presented in [104], based on
Direct Memory Access (DMA) aided by master burst and BRAM caching techniques. Another
extensive effort is demonstrated in [105] where the JTAG dynamic power consumption is
measured via a digital oscilloscope from a Spartan III FPGA that does not have an ICAP
interface. The reconfiguration time for a PR bitfile of 21KB was 34 ms, utilizing ICAP instead
with a performance of 66MB/Sec on a Virtex II device would reduce the configuration time to
0.32 ms, and this 99% reduction in configuration time would again yield considerable reduction
in reconfiguration power.

The final goal of this work is to combine the CTMC and the BL-TMR experiments into one
holistic experiment that shows the expected savings of SMART over TMR in the nine use cases.
We experimentally calculated the T S1 values of the nine UCs, and used these realistic values as
an input to the weighted average in Eq.1 to calculate the area and power overhead of RARS
under the nine UCs. The RARS expected values were compared against benchmarks 5 and 22 as
the top designs in term of area and power, respectively. Table 24 shows the holistic experiment
results, where TMR was the recommended approach over SMART only in UC4 and UC7. For
the remaining use cases SMART consistently showed better power and area requirements. The
power savings ranged from 22% to 29%, whereas the area savings ranged from 17% to 24%.
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Table 24: Combining Availability, Area, and Power Results

UC

S1
(A, Low
Power,
low
Area)

S2, S3
(A, High
Power,
High
Area)

S4-S10
1-A, High
Power,
High
Area)

Avg
Area

Power
Savings
over
Design
22

Area
Savings
over
Design
5

Recommended
Method

A
(%)

Avg
Power

1

86.704%

12.1379%

1.15828%

98.8417

125.3

15319.13

24.66%

19.22%

SMART

2

98.707%

1.28331%

0.01014%

99.9899

118

14284.5

29.05%

23.83%

SMART

3

99.833%

0.16663%

0.00012%

99.9999

117.3

14187.37

29.46%

24.27%

SMART

4

11.130%

24.8876%

63.9821%

36.0179

171.2

21833.57

-2.94%

-9.83%

TMR

5

81.162%

16.5161%

2.32216%

97.6778

128.7

15796.86

22.64%

17.09%

SMART

6

97.522%

2.43057%

0.04736%

99.9526

118.7

14386.6

28.62%

23.38%

SMART

7

31.189%

34.3823%

34.4291%

65.5709

159

20104.55

4.38%

-2.12%

TMR

8

90.189%

9.15584%

0.65490%

99.3451

123.2

15018.69

25.94%

20.56%

SMART

9

98.798%

1.19488%

0.00749%

99.9925

118

14276.64

29.08%

23.87%

SMART
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Reliability emerges as one of the most significant concerns in the new era of nano-scale devices
[106]. Nano-electronic systems promise immense advancements in term of power, performance,
area, and cost, making them ideal platforms to host many of the computing ideas that are yet to
be explored in our modern days. However, existing reliability techniques might not be able to
scale in compliance with the ever-shrinking device technology. Therefore, novel paradigms that
exploit the massive underlying parallelism of the nano-scale devices might be needed. This
dissertation explores the possibility of imparting self-x properties to enable these paradigms.

7.1. Technical Summary
The OC paradigm has been widely accepted as a potential model for future computing systems,
where numerous independent computing agents can exchange sensory data and actuation
knowledge to regulate system-level parameters, leading to the emergence of self-x properties that
cannot be spotted at the individual component level.

Therefore, an organically-inspired SMART approach was presented, which can adapt to runtime
failures based on alternative configurations. This allows for use of a continuum of power and
area utilizations versus reliability. The organic hardware layer provides decentralized awareness
and control by means of distributed RARS module across the hardware fabric. The supervisory
software layer provides the ability to assimilate hardware sensory information while providing
vital centralization for decision-making.
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RARS avoided the dilemma of choosing a fixed redundancy degree by deferring a commitment
to a particular fault handling configuration until run-time. This approach, utilizing
reconfigurability of SRAM-FPGAs, demonstrates an effective use of resources depending upon
current mission conditions. TMR consumes three times the required resources to survive during
the short periods of time when faults hit the application. RARS, in contrast, adapts to the various
requirements at different stages of the mission by enabling just the right amount of spares.
Unnecessary spares can be completely disabled or even replaced by other circuits. In the age of
power-aware applications, where cooling and battery-life are as crucial as performance, RARS is
able to save up to 30% of the power used by TMR, while still providing protection against
transient and permanent faults.

Offline repair is entirely undesirable in modern mission-critical applications whereby the system
must show graceful degradation and partial ability to function even when being refurbished.
Partial reconfiguration made it possible to keep the system online while under repair. It also
enabled fast reconfiguration, reducing the repair time and increasing system availability. Finally,
it allowed for the implementation of innovative solutions at the software layer, such as lazy
scrubbing and intrinsic fitness evaluation.

The software layer relied on a JTAG interface to communicate with the FPGA and to download
partial bitfiles. This layer facilitated experiments with evolutionary repair where the fault
recovery is not limited by the number of available spares. OGA, unlike other conventional GAs,
supported features that are well-matched to the OC requirements. The model-free fitness
function enabled the GA to be portable and scalable to fit any application domains. Direct
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bitstream evolution reduced the mapping time of the genetic material into physical individuals,
thereby boosting the performance of the GA. Finally, intrinsic evolution improved the accuracy
of the GA because it allowed the evolution to happen on the actual hardware rather than a
software model.

7.2. Future Work
Future work can target any aspects of SMART that were deemed out of the scope of this work,
such as recovering faults in the AE. AE is considered as a golden element in this work, previous
work by our research group has demonstrated successful methods to protect the voting logic
[90]. Integration effort is considered to combine the two methods into one integrated system.
Extending the power analysis to cover the GA process with the associated complexity of
experimentally measuring and analytically modeling the configuration process power, can be
another useful expansion to aid in predicting and controlling SMART in mission-critical
deployments.

A novel OGA based on Island-based GA (IGA) [64] can greatly contribute to the hard-fault selfrepair mechanisms of SMART. The proposed future work aims to map the islands of the IGA to
dynamically reconfigurable FEs on the FPGA device. The goal is to grow and shrink the number
of islands based on the availability of reconfigurable resources at any stage of the mission.
Adding and removing islands will impact the MTTR of hard-faults and also change the
dynamicity of the resource utilization of SMART.
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For instance, if an island is to be retired due to fault scenarios or in order to utilize its
reconfigurable resources for a different task, SMART needs to choose from many options
regarding which island to retire and how to handle the individuals of that island. For example,
SMART can retire the lowest fit island, which might be a costly decision if good building blocks
of the GA are lost. It can also retire an island such that diversity-preservation is maximized.
Another alternative is to retire any random island but rescue a selected set of individuals by
migrating them to other islands. The question here becomes what are the selection criteria for
these rescued individuals? Should that be fitness, diversity, or both?

On the other hand, when SMART has a newly available reconfigurable block to make use of, and
thus decides to populate a new island in order to expedite the evolutionary process, what would
be the best way to construct the new island? Would that be creating a super island comprising the
best performers across all other islands? Although this Pareto-preserving option seems optimal, it
might not produce good solutions if the best performers across all islands have converged
similarly, leading to a super island that lacks the genetic diversity to promote new innovative
solutions. The other extreme alternative is to compose the island such that diversity is
maximized, by analyzing the variance of selected individuals and picking the ones that are
different from the rest. Randomly populating the new island with immigrants from other islands
might lead to more diversity and thus promote better solutions

These are all interesting question to answer, and we believe that IGA can be a rich field to
analyze in the context of organic computing on reconfigurable devices due to its compatibility
with the OC paradigm and its technical suitability for reconfigurable devices.
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APPENDIX: COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL MESSAGES
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This is a summary of the communication protocol messages

Protocol Attribute

Description

Implementation
Direction
Communication Type

Socket Communication
Bidirectional
Asynchronous (Producer/Consumer)

Message – 1
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

DISCREPANCY_REPORT
String
Hardware layer
Software layer
MSG_ CODE

Message Format

Message Trigger(s)

Message Description

5

AE_ID

Log2 |AE|

FE_ID

TMR

FAULT_ ARTICULATION
_ INPUT

TIME_STAMP

2

1

n- bit Functional Input

TBD

Discrepancy detected by the AE
This message is sent whenever an AE detects discrepancy
among its FEs. The TMR flag is used to specify the
configuration of the organic unit when the discrepancy was
detected. A TMR flag value of 1 indicates that the 3 FEs were
simultaneously used in voting scheme, and the FE_ID in this
case specifies the discrepant FE, whereas a 0 value indicates
the original configuration of two online FEs and one Coldspare standby (duplex mode), the FE_ID reflects the address of
the cold-standby FE in this case. The n-bit
FAULT_ARTICULATION_INPUT provides the AS with the
actual input that articulated the discrepancy; this could be
useful for the Software layer and/or RM to regenerate the fault
scenario during the refurbishment process.

Message – 2
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

FE_STATUS_REQUEST
String
Software layer
Hardware layer
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MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log 2 |AE|

2

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Software layer initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic.

Message Description

This message is sent from the Software layer to the organic
layer to query the status of any number of FEs. The addresses
of the AEs/FEs can be specifically provided to target specific
FE or a broadcast address (e.g. address zero) can be used to
query multiple FEs. For example, if the AE_ID is 3 and the
FE_ID is 0, the AE that has the address of (3) has to respond
with three FE_STATUS_REPORT messages (Message-3) for
each one of its FEs. Also, if the AE_ID field is zero and the
FE_ID is 2, all AEs in the organic layer have to report the
status of their FE with the address 2. It is apparent that an
FE_STATUS__REQUEST message with both AE_ID and
FE_ID fields filled with zero means a full broadcast to the
organic layer to send the status of every single FE to the
cognitive layer.

Message – 3
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

FE_STATUS_REPORT
String
Hardware layer
Software layer

MSG_CODE

AE_ID

FE_ID

STATUS

TIME _ STAMP

Message Format
5

Log2 |AE|

2

3

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Response to Message-2

Message Description

Responding to Message-2, an AE has to send one
FE_STATUS_REPORT message per FE to the Software layer.
Contrary to message-2, The AE_ID and FE_ID fields cannot
specify a broadcast address in this message; they have to
explicitly indicate the sender identity.

Message – 4
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Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

TMR_ACTIVATION_REQUEST
String
Software layer
Hardware layer

MSG _CODE

AE_ID

TIME _STAMP

Message Format
5

Message Trigger(s)

Message Description

Log2 |AE|

TBD

Software layer initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic.
It could be due to performance degradation below the mission
requirements for this organic unit (FEs and AE).
Software layer can send this message to one/all AEs in the
organic layer to trigger TMR configuration activation. The
targeted AE(s) respond by activating TMR among FEs and
confirm back by sending Message-5
(TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT)

Message – 5
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT
String
Hardware layer
Software layer

MSG _ CODE

AE _ID

TIME _ STAMP

Message Format
5

Log2 |AE|

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

- Response to Message-4
- Autonomous response taken by the AE itself.

Message Description

Software layer described in message-4, this message is a
confirmation from AE to Software layer that TMR has been
configured among the three FEs Software layer requested or a
notification to the Software layer that the AE has
autonomously activated the TMR mode.

Message Name
Message Type

REFURBISH _REQUEST
String

Message – 6
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Message Source
Message Destination

Software layer
Hardware layer

MSG_CODE

AE_ ID

FE_ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Message Trigger(s)

Message Description

2

Log2 |AE |

TBD

Software layer initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic.
It could be due to one of the FEs was reported faulty, or due to
performance degradation below the mission requirements.
This message is sent from the Software layer whenever
refurbishment is needed. For example this call can initiate
running GA to repair faulty FE(s). The same principle of
broadcast addressing described in Message-2 is applicable to
this message.

Message – 7
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

REFURBISH _REPORT
String
Hardware layer
Software layer

MSG_ CODE

AE_ID

FE_ID

FITNESS_ VALUE

TIME_STAMP

2

Log2|Fitness|

TBD

Message Format
5

Log2 |AE|

Message Trigger(s)

Refurbishment process is finished.

Message Description

This message is sent from the AE to Software layer upon
refurbish completion. The final fitness value of the refurbished
FE is reported in the message so that it can be used in future
mission-specific decision making.

Message – 8
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

FE_STATUS_CHANGE _REQUEST
String
Software layer
Hardware layer
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MSG _CODE

AE _ID

FE_ID

STATUS

TIME _ STAMP

2

Log 2 |STATUS|

TBD

Message Format
5

Message Trigger(s)

Message Description

Log2 |AE|

- FE is put under-repair.
- FE was refurbished and the Software layer decides that it is
eligible to be put online.
- FE has failed to be refurbished and claimed un-repairable and
hence should be decommissioned
The Software layer can send this message to change the status
of FE(s). Broadcasting can be used to specify more than one
FE in a single command, provided that they will be changed to
the same status. The target AE will respond by changing the
status of the addressed FE(s) and send a confirmation of the
change to the Software layer (as described in Message-2).

Message – 9
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

PING _REQUEST
String
Software layer
Hardware layer

MSG_ CODE

AE_ID

TIME _ STAMP

Message Format
5

Log2 |AE|

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Software layer checks that the AE is alive.

Message Description

The Ping message is used by the Software layer to check the
health of the AEs to check if it is minimally responsive. The
broadcast addressing can be used to ping all the AEs in the
organic layer. AEs respond to the Ping message by sending a
PING_REPLY to the Software layer (As described in
Message-10)

Message – 10
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source

PING_REPLY
String
Hardware layer
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Message Destination

Software layer

MSG_ CODE

TIME _ STAMP

AE_ID

Message Format
5

Log2 |AE|

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Response to Message-9

Message Description

This message is sent from the AE to the Software layer as a
reply for the PING_REQUEST (Message-9).

Message – 11
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST
String
Software layer
Hardware layer
MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

CONFIG_ID
_

Message Format
5

Message Trigger(s)

Message Description

Log 2 |AE|

2

TBD

- AE is not responding properly (Any failure to respond such
as ping failure)
- Software layer decided to change the functionality of the
organic unit.
This message is sent from the Software layer to the AE(s) to
change the configuration of the corresponding FE(s). The
broadcast addressing can be used in this message. The AE will
respond by downloading the requested configuration and reply
with the RECONFIGURATION_REPORT message
(Message-12)

Message – 12
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

TBD

RECONFIGURATION_REPORT
String
Hardware layer
Software layer
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MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log 2 |AE|

2

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Response to Message-11

Message Description

This message is a response to the
RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST (Message-11).

Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REQUEST
String
Software layer
Hardware layer

Message – 13

MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Message Trigger(s)

Message Description

Log 2 |AE|

2

Take one FE offline in order to: refurbish, decommission, or
switch back to normal duplex operation due to fault recovery
achievement.
As the Software layer has the capability to instruct Hardware
layer to switch to TMR mode (Message-4), it can also switch it
back to duplex mode under the situations mentioned above in
(Message Triggers). FE_ID field specifies the FE module that
will be taken offline (the other two FEs will be running in
duplex mode)

Message – 14
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

TBD

DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REPORT
String
Hardware layer
Software layer
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MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log 2 |AE|

2

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Response to Message-13

Message Description

Once the AE changes the configuration to duplex mode, it
reports back the new configuration to the Software layer, the
FE_ID fields indicates the offline FE.

Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

GET_OL_CONFIGURATION_REQUEST
String
Software layer
Hardware layer

Message – 15

MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log 2 |AE|

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Software layer initiated when it needs information about how
the organic layer is organized

Message Description

The Software layer sends this message to request the
configuration of the Organic Layer.

Message – 16
Message Name
Message Type
Message Source
Message Destination

OL_CONFIGURATION_REPORT
String
Hardware layer
Software layer

Adjacency list

Message Format
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Message Trigger(s)

Response to message-15

Message Description

The Hardware layer sends this message to report the
configuration of the Organic Layer, the organization of the
organic units is sent in the format of an adjacency list.
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